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International Intellectual Property Shelters
Sam F. Halabi*
The battle over thereach and strengthofintemationalprotecionsforintellectualproperty
rights is one of the critical flashpoints between wealthy and low-income countres: those
protectionsare perceived to obstruct access to essentialmedicines, thwartregulatoryefforts to
promote ndvidualandpopulation health, and undermine traditionalforms ofagrculturc and
foodproduction. Wule scholarshave thorougly tracked the bilateralandmultilateraltrade and
investment treaties responsible for the expansion of international intellectualproperty nghts
worldwide, they have paidsignificantlyless attention to the strength and form thatopposition to
internationalintellectualproperty expansion has taken. This Article examines the proliferation
of internationallegal agreements that carve out special areas of intellectual property for
treatment that differs from protections extended under internationaltrade andinvestment rules
and argues that they should be reconceivedas a unified body of intemationaleconomic law
Responding to demands from low- andmiddle-income countries thatbenefits from intellectual
property protections be more equitably shared these 'international intellectual property
shelters"include the Doha Declarationon the TRJPSAgreement and Public Health, the World
Health Organizations PandemicInfluenza PreparednessStandardManual TransferAgreements,
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources forFood andAgriculture,andthe proposedMedicalResearchandInnovation Treaty
This Article analyzes the circumstances that give rise to internationalintellectual prmpeny
shelters and the aspects of intellectualproperty rghts they attempt to regulate. While these
sheltersare advocatedas safeguardsfor areasofglobalpub'c welfare, such as food securityand
population health, they tend to arise in areas in which a small number ofknowledge-intensive
firms dominate globalmarkets Internationalintellectualpropeity shelters should therefore be
understoodas forms ofsupranationalregulationofthose irAms.
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INTRODUCTION

The transition of advanced modem economies from industrial
production to knowledge creation and exploitation has placed the role
of intellectual property at the center of fierce debates about economic
development, human rights, and the historical and accelerating
concentration of global wealth. As the world's wealthiest countries
seek to expand intellectual property protections through their bilateral,
regional, and multilateral trade and investment agreements, the tension
between economic monopoly and access to knowledge embedded in
intellectual property's conceptual core has become a geopolitical
flashpoint. Proponents of strong intellectual property protections
argue that those protections are necessary to encourage investment in
research and development, which ultimately facilitates technology and
knowledge transfer to low- and middle-income countries. In the face
of an exploding HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa, a representative of
global pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that
"[p]atents are the lifeblood of our industry" and insisted that curtailing
patent rights, even to facilitate access to HIV/AIDS medications,
would jeopardize the long-term development of critical medicines:
"There is a need not to fight the firefighters."' Critics responded that
the protections afforded intellectual property proprietors, particularly
patent and trademark holders, weigh disproportionately in favor of
private rights over social welfare and magnify wealth disparities of all
kinds. 2 Environmental activist Vandana Shiva declared of the
international intellectual property regime:
The seed wars, trade wars, patent protection, and intellectual property
rights [at the World Trade Organization] are claims to ownership
through separation and fragmentation. If the regime of rights being

1.

MELISSA FAY GREENE, THERE Is No ME WrrHouT You: ONE WOMAN'S ODYSSEY

To RESCUE AFRICA'S CHILDREN 199 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2.
See Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Making EssentialMedicines Atfordable to the
Poor,20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 581, 582-84 (2002); Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, IN&a S Supreme
Court To HearDispute on Drug Patents, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/3/7/business/globa/indias-supreme-court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-n-drugpatents.html.
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demanded ... is implemented, the transfer of funds from poor to rich
countries will exacerbate the Third World crisis 10 times over.'

Intellectual property protection has dominated international trade
and investment negotiations for the last thirty years, playing a critical
role in the success, delay, controversy, or termination of agreements
like those overseen by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), and the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), to name only the broadest
multilateral treaties.'
Industrialized states successfully tied the
intellectual property protections they desired to the reductions in tariffs
and other barriers to imports of foreign agricultural, clothing, and
textile goods sought by many developing countries, formalized in the
WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).' Thousands of bilateral investment treaties, largely
forged between developed states and developing states, include strong
protections for intellectual property rights that frequently exceed those
in existing international agreements, even TRIPS, and certainly those
typically found in national legislative frameworks.' This network of
agreements has generated a wide range of enforcement mechanisms
that reach beyond the slow and relatively impotent diplomatic methods
that characterized the earlier generation of international intellectual
property protections.'

3.
VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY. THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 56
(1997).
4.
See Sam F. Halabi, Mulipolar*y Intellectual Property, and the Internaonalization ofPublicHealth Law, 35 MICH.J.INT'LL. 715, 743-53 (2014).
5.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 8,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex IC,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS].
6.
Burton Ong, The TademarkLaw ProvisionsofBilateralFreeTade Agreements,
in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY, A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 229, 230
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) ("Similarly, trademark law provisions
which have found their way into bilateral free trade agreements are also intended to fortify
and, in most cases, expand the domestic legal framework from which trademark owners
derive their exclusive rights.").
7.
See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 135 (1995); Just Balstad
Haffeld, Harald Siem & John-Arne Rottingen, Examining the Global Health Arena:
Strengths and Weaknesses ofa Convention Approach to Global Health Challenges 38 J.L.
MED. & ETI-cs 614, 616-24 (2010); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a
Function of Competing Conceptions ofInternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J.INT'L L. 345, 350-58
(1998); Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in InternationalLaw, 36
CORNELL INT'L L. 93, 116-17 (2003); Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory ofInternationl
Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 311 (1968).

2016]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHEL TERS

Confrontations between the growing strength of international
intellectual property protections and the development interests of lowand middle-income countries have correspondingly increased.! Strong
intellectual property protections for products and processes relevant to
agricultural production, access to medicines, and public health
measures have generated disputes arising under both WTO rules and
bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements. In 1998,
pharmaceutical firms holding antiretroviral drug patents brought suit
against the South African government for its efforts to use parallel
imports and price controls to expand access to treatment for its
exploding HIV/AIDS population Their suit was based in significant
part on the failure of the government's legislative basis for the
measures to comply with TRIPS.'" Agriculture and seed companies
based in the United States and Europe have regularly clashed with both
farmers in developing countries and their governments over attempts
to interrupt agricultural practices with patent infringement claims." In
2007, Indonesia withheld samples of H5Nl avian influenza from the
World Health Organization (WHO) on the basis that it was
commonplace for developing countries to share their biological
resources only to have them exploited, patented, and generated into
commercial products priced out of the reach of consumers in the
originating country-a particular problem in the context of medicines
and vaccines."
These confrontations have resulted in a kind of guerilla warfare
against strong international intellectual property protections, using
either loopholes in trade and investment agreements themselves or by
developing parallel treaties and international agreements that cut away
at the strength of intellectual property protections. Although there is in
fact a specialized U.N. agency for intellectual property, 3 the World
8.
See Susy Frankel, WTO Application of'he CustomaryRules ofInterpretationof
PublicInternationalLaw"to IntellectualProperty,46 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 378 (2006) ("GAT
panels did not have any ability to affect intellectual property laws, and there was no effective
international enforcement of international intellectual property treaties").
9.
See Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CI. J.INT'L L. 27, 30-31 (2002).
10. William W Fisher III & Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS
Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy, BERKMAN CTR., http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2005).
11.
See discussion infra Part IVD.
12. David R Fidler, Perspective, Influenza Virus Samples, InternationalLaw,and
Global Health Diplomacy, 14 EMERGING INFEcTious DISEASES 88, 88-89 (2008), http://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/1/pdfs/vl4-nl.pdf.
13. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/portaen/index.htnl (last
visited Feb. 19, 2016).

908

TULANE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 90:903

Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), its membership is
dominated by countries leading the opposition to strong international
intellectual property protections and has thus never served as the
central forum for the development of substantive international
intellectual property law, focusing instead on coordination and
harmonization. 4 The aforementioned agreements themselves do
provide circumscribed limitations. TRIPS, for example, includes
provisions encouraging technology transfer and protecting interests in
"public health and nutrition." Other agreements leave substantial
flexibility for implementation, allowing a country, for example, to
devote relatively fewer prosecutorial resources to intellectual property
rights enforcement. 6
In the class of approaches identified and analyzed in this Article,
negotiators from developed and low- and middle-income countries
target areas of overreach or defectiveness in existing intellectual
property protections and draft entirely new agreements that aim to
curtail expansive intellectual property rights or to impose more rigid
regimes to force sharing of innovations and other benefits. I call the
subject areas and provisions of these agreements "international
intellectual property shelters," discrete areas of public concern like
access to medicines, agricultural technology, and public health
measures in which the strong intellectual property protections that now
prevail under international economic law give way to realigned
incentives for intellectual property rights holders or, in some cases, are
jettisoned altogether.
This Article is the first to argue that these international
intellectual property shelters--often couched within the language of
biodiversity, public health, and food security-represent a body of
international economic law that should be understood as a single,
cohesive phenomenon that has emerged in response to intellectual
property protections expanding through trade and investment
agreements. From the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health (Doha Declaration) 7 to the WHO's Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Standard Material Transfer Agreements (Pandemic
14.
See Rachel Brewster, The Surpising Benefits to Developing Counties of
Linking InternatonalTrade andIntellectualProperty,12 CH. J.INT'L L. 1, 23-25 (2011); see
alsoGregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trialsof Winning
at the WTO: What Lies BehindBrazil's Success, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 409-11 (2008)
(focusing on the WTO's inadequacies inmeeting the demands of developing countries).
15.
TRIPS, supra note 5,arts. 7-8.
16. Brewster, supranote 14, at 23-25, 35.
17. TRIPS, supra note 5.
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Influenza Preparedness Framework) 18to the proposed Medical
Research and Innovation Treaty,'9 international intellectual property
shelters put at their core the fundamental distributive questions strong
intellectual property rights raise. The Doha Declaration broke the
monopoly patents gave pharmaceutical firms over price structure, at
least for the diseases designated in the agreement." The Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Framework conditioned pharmaceutical firms'
access to influenza biological materials for research and development
purposes on donation and discounted pricing of resulting vaccines and
medical countermeasures.2 ' The Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) provided a legal basis for many jurisdictions to
effectively eliminate tobacco trademarks. 22 These innovations
fundamentally restructured the relationship between innovation,
intellectual property, and access otherwise envisioned in international
trade and investment agreements.
This Article also previews two related aspects of these shelters
more extensively developed in subsequent work. 3 International
intellectual property shelters have emerged not just where an issue of
public or global welfare is at stake; if that were the case, there would
be many more of them. Rather, these shelters have tended to emerge
in economic sectors where a small number of global firms dominate.
The first shelter, WHO's 1981 International Code of Marketing of
Breast-Milk Substitutes," was essentially created to regulate Nestle
and its 50% global infant formula market share, although Gerber,
Bristol-Myers, and Abbott also maintained substantial global
operations." At the time the International Seed Treaty was formed,
four agrochemical firms controlled 56% of the global seed market. 6
18.
See Pandemic Influenza PreparednessFramework for the Sharing of Influenza
Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other Benefits, WHO (2011), http://apps.who.int/gb/
pip/pdf files/pandemic-influenza-preparedness-en.pdf [hereinafter Pandemic Influenza
PreparednessFramework].
19.
See World Health Assembly Res. WHA59.24 (May 27, 2006), http://apps.who.
int/medicinedocs/documents/s21428en/s21428en.pdf.
20. See discussion infia Part WA.
See discussion infa Part 1VC.
21.
22.
See discussion hifia Part IV.E
23.
See SAM E HALABI, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER:

KNOWLEDGE, EXPLOITATION, AND RESISTANCE (Cambridge University

Press forthcoming 2017).
24. International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, WHO (1981),
http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/code-english.pdf.
25.
See discussion jnfia Part II.B. 1.
26. Philip H. Howard, Visualizng Consolidationin the Global Seed industry, 19962008, 1 SUSTAINABILrrY 1266, 1270 (2009), http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/l/4/1266/pdf.
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Similar concentrations prevailed in the tobacco and pharmaceutical
sectors when relevant agreements were initiated or concluded. 7 Public
health, biodiversity, and vaccine sharing treaties are, at least in part,
efforts at supranational regulation of concentrated global industries.
Like domestic regulatory systems, international intellectual
property shelters may adopt performance standards, command-andcontrol mechanisms, or incentive-based measures to affect firms'
behavior. Similarly, international intellectual property shelters, as
supranational regulation, may be captured, co-opted, or diluted in ways
that ultimately undermine their welfare-enhancing or redistributive
objectives. While there has been a relatively short time to observe
their influence, some experiences already suggest that some aspects of
regime design and participant inclusion may impart important lessons
for future efforts.
Part II of this Article traces the history of international
intellectual property protections from the relatively modest and weak
1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention) to the contemporary wide network of bilateral, regional,
and multilateral investment and trade treaties with significant
enforcement mechanisms.18 Part Ell illustrates the tensions generated
by expanding international intellectual property protections through
episodes in which strong patent and trademark protections appeared to
threaten public health and food security in low- and middle-income
countries.
Part IV identifies and analyzes the emergence of
international intellectual property shelters: agreements formed to
curtail or eliminate strong intellectual property protections that would
otherwise protect patents and trademarks in critical public health and
agricultural sectors. Part V previews two aspects of international
intellectual property shelters relevant not only for understanding why
and how they have emerged, but also how they may achieve their
objectives. The first is the relationship between those shelters and
concentrated global industries; the second is the regulatory design each
uses to change default international intellectual property protections.
Part VI provides a brief conclusion.

27. See discussion JhfaPart 1VB, F
28. J.H. Reichman, Universal Minihnum StandardsofIntellectualPropertyPmtecton
Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreemen4 29 INT'L LAw. 345, 361-61 (1995)
("In retrospect, the weakness of the international regime governing trademark protection
derived only in part from the failure of key developing countries to adhere to the Paris
Convention (or to its later versions), and mainly from the lax enforcement of existing norms
that state practice tolerated.").
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THE GROWING STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTIONS

The growth of intellectual property protections through
international legal instruments and treaties has been sweeping and
rapid.29 Intellectual property protections have expanded not only in
terms of their scope, but also in their enforceability.0 While patents
were protected as early as the 1883 Paris Convention, new
international agreements assert protection over most, if not all, aspects
of information submitted to national regulatory authorities in
connection with marketing approvals. Pharmaceutical intellectual
property rights, for example, have in many agreements expanded to
include all clinical and animal testing information used to support a
patent or approval application. Many bilateral investment treaties
include broadly worded protections for intellectual property (e.g.,
"know-how"), which grant parties the right to bring a government
before international arbitrators if regulatory measures adversely affect
that right as an "investment."32 The end result is that international
intellectual property protection is now much stronger than when it was
envisioned toward the end of the nineteenth century.3
A.

The 1883 ParisConvention for the ProtectonofIndusftral
Property

The origin of the world's first major intellectual property treaty is
traced to an 1873 invitation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire to
foreign governments to participate in an international exhibition of
inventions in Vienna. 4 Inventors hesitated to attend out of fear that
their creations would be stolen or copied, leading a small group of
states to seek out a way to protect their citizens' industrial and
intellectual property as they moved across borders.3 The resulting
29.
See Jennifer Prah Ruger, Normative Foundationsof GlobalHealth Law, 96 GEO.
L.J.423, 438-39 (2008).
30. Id.
31.
Id.at 435-36.
32.
See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Switz.-Uru., art. 5, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Switz.-Uru. BIT].
33.
See Kojo Yelpaala, Quo Va&s WTO? The Threat of TRIPS and the Biodiversity
Convention to Human Health and Food Secuty, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55, 57-70 (2012)
(discussing developments in intellectual property protection from the 1883 Paris Convention
to the creation of the WTO).
34.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 359 (1997).

35. Id.at 359-60; G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industial Property, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 2, 9-16
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Paris Convention created a legal union between participating states in
which foreign industrial design, patent, and trademark applications
received the same treatment as national applications, obtained priority
in other participating states if first protected in one of the union
jurisdictions, and enjoyed substantive protections codified in the
treaty.36 Membership in the Paris Convention grew from 11 parties in
1883 to 174 in 2013. 37
The treaties created reasonable exemptions for covered
intellectual properties. Compulsory patent licenses were always
contemplated for public health and national security reasons, while the
addition of article 6(B)(iii) in 1934 allowed the denial of registration or
the invalidation of trademarks that could mislead consumers.38 The
WTO's TRIPS later incorporated the Paris Convention, although
TRIPS substantially narrowed its exceptions.3"
The Paris Convention's enforcement mechanisms were almost
entirely reputational and diplomatic." In 1967, the parties agreed to
transfer administration of the intellectual property treaties to an
international organization, WIPO, which began operating formally in
1970 and then as a specialized agency of the United Nations starting in

(1969), http://www.wipo.intledocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/611/wipo-pub-611.pdf (listing
the eleven original signatories to the 1883 Paris Convention: Belgium, Brazil, France,
Guatemala, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland); Seth M.
Reiss, Commentary on the Pans Convention for the Protectionof IndustnialProperty,LEXIP.COM 1-2, http://www.lex-ip.com/Paris.pdf(last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
36. Reiss, supm note 35.
37.
WIPO-Administered Treaties,WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/enlShowResults.jsp?lang--en&search-what-B&bojid=5 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
38. See Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20,
1883 Revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900, at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The
Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958
art. 6(B)(iii), Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1, 828 U.N.TS. 107 [hereinafter Paris Convention];
Bodenhausen, supra note 35, at 70, 116 ("[Compulsory licenses] may be the case when
patents concern vital interests of the country in the fields of military security or public health
.... The purpose of [article 6(B)(iii)] was to enable the member States to refuse or invalidate
trademarks containing suggestions that the goods concerned possessed non-existing qualities
....
"1).
39. 2 J.W BAXTER, JOHN R SiNNOTT, WILLIAM JOSEPH COTRRAU & JESSICA M.
SINNOTT, BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 8 (2015) (discussing the local
working requirements of article 5.A of the Paris Convention after TRIPS and laying out
approaches used by some countries); Overview.- The TRIPS Agreemen4 WTO, https://www.
wto.org/english/tratopse/tripse/intel2e.htn (last visited Feb. 19, 2016) ("With the exception
of the provisions of the Berne Convention on moral rights, all the main substantive provisions
of these conventions are incorporated by reference and thus become obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement between TRIPS Member countries.").
40. Reichnan, supra note 28, at 347.
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1974.' WIPO has largely overseen the growing body of intellectual
property rights harmonization and coordination treaties like the Patent
Cooperation Treaty and the Trademark Law Treaty.2 Because WIPO
became a specialized agency of the United Nations during the same
period that developing and newly independent states were pressing for
the New International Economic Order, WIPO never promoted strong
international intellectual property protections.43
B.

InternationalTradeLaw

International intellectual property law became decidedly more
influential not only when it merged with the international free trade
regime, but also when it became equipped with judicial enforcement
requirements that gave intellectual property right holders the capability
to enforce those rights in domestic courts and administrative tribunals.
Because the Paris Convention and other efforts at international
intellectual property protection failed to satisfy the demands of states
with strong intellectual property rights-holding constituencies,
individual states often regulated intellectual property practices through
domestic trade statutes.
For example, in the United States, section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 grants the President the authority to take necessary action,
including retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or
practice of a foreign government that burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce and either violates an international trade agreement,
discriminates against the United States, or "imposes unjustifiable or
unreasonable barriers" to U.S. commerce." In 1988, the United States
Congress enhanced section 301 by requiring the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) to compile "Special 301" Reports,
identifying countries that do not provide "adequate and effective"
protection of intellectual property rights or "fair and equitable market
access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property

41.
Christopher May, The Pre-HistoryandEstablishmentofthe WIPO, 2009 WIPO J.
16, 19-22, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/wipo-joumal/wipo-journal11.
pdf.
42. Id at 24.
43. Peter K. Yu, The Global IntellectualProperty OrderandIts UndeteminedFuture,
2009 WIPO J. 1, 12, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/wipo-journal/wipo_
journal -ll.pdf.
44. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041-42 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b) (2012)).
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[rights]." '5 These reporting mechanisms are a robust source of pressure
from knowledge-intensive industries like pharmaceutical firms that
maintain active monitoring and reporting systems for purposes of
filing Special 301 complaints. 6 Yet, even efforts like these confront
diplomatic and political limits. Key allies of the United States often
appear on the reports, but strong military ties, for example, are
sufficient to deter serious pressure from the U.S. government. Because
bilateral pressure was not sufficient, a broader, multilateral agreement
on intellectual property appeared necessary to achieve global
protection for strong intellectual property rights.
1.

The WTO

After the failure of the Bretton Woods-envisioned International
Trade Organization to materialize, the less centralized General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the organizing treaty
under which states reduced official or governmental barriers to trade."
Over eight rounds of negotiations lasting more than forty years, trading
states lowered tariffs as well as "nontariff barriers" to trade like
customs procedures, import licensing requirements, and export
subsidies." The so-called Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations
commenced in 1986 and lasted through 1994, when the WTO was
established.
The "WTO" refers not only to the international facility based in
Geneva, but also to about sixty agreements it oversees, several of
which explicitly or implicitly advance strong protections for
intellectual property rights." The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) governs potentially trade restrictive labeling regulations,
while TRIPS requires that states pass laws providing intellectual
45.
19 U.S.C. § 2242; see 2009 Special 301 Report, USTR (Apr. 30, 2009), https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%2OVersion%20of/ 2Othe%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%2
OREPORT.pdf.
46.
US. Bullying on Drug Patents." One Year After Doha OXFAM GB (Nov. 2002),
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/us-bullying-on-drug-patents-one-year-afterdoha- 115060 (follow "English paper" hyperlink).
47.
John W Head, Throwing Eggs at Windows." Legaland InsfitutionalGlobalizaton
in the 21st-CenturyEconomy,50 KAN. L.REV. 731, 734, 743 (2002).
48.
See Willem Pretorius, TRIPS and Developing Counfes: How Level Is the
Playing Field?, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND
DEVELOPMENT 183, 184-85 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 2002); Frankel, supm note 8,
at 376.
49.
See Brewster, supm note 14, at 11.
See John D. Blum, Law as Development Reshaping the GlobalLegal Suctures
50.
ofPublicHealth, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 207, 217-18 (2004).
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property rights holders with a number of administrative and judicial
protections.' The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS) established the principles by which states may regulate food
safety, but its standard-setting body, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission (Codex), often passes guidelines and codes of conduct
that affect intellectual property rights like trademarks."
2.

TRIPS

TRIPS is by far the most controversial of the WTO agreements
with respect to tensions between wealthy and lower income states. 3
Unlike the general theory of reducing legal and tax barriers to trade
that justified GATT, TRIPS was theoretically justified by the need to
increasethe legal protections of intellectual property right holders in
order to facilitate expansion of products and processes (and their
distinguishing symbols), as well as creative works, into new markets."4
TRIPS grants patent, copyright, and trademark holders rights to
minimal statutory protections as well as the right to resort to
administrative and judicial processes to enforce those rights."
Member states may pass protections greater than those detailed in
TRIPS, 6 but additional protections must be extended to nationals of
other member states. In addition to substantive provisions, TRIPS
also outlines a comprehensive framework for civil adjudication of
intellectual property rights. 8 Member states must create private causes
of action, 9 as well as remedies including injunctions, money damages,
and the use of border restrictions. ' States must also give intellectual

51.
See id at 218.
52. Id; Emily Lee, The World Health Orgarization Global Strategy on Diet
PhysicalActvity, and Health: Turning Strategy into Action 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 569, 579
(2005).
53. SeeYelpaala, supranote 33, at 63-64.
54.
TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 16. See generally NuNo PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE
TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS (3d ed. 2010) (providing a background explanation of the

history and economics of patent rights under TRIPS).
55.

See DE CARVALHO, supranote 54.

56. TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
57. See id art. 3 (providing the caveat that this provision is subject to any Paris
Convention exceptions).
58. See id art. 41.
59. See Patricia L. Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 613, 620-23
(2011).
60. TRIPS, supranote 5, arts. 44-45, 57.
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property rights holders access to judicial review of all administrative
decisions concerning their intellectual property laws."
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the trade liberalization negotiation
process had been driven by the trade priorities of developed states; the
negotiation process largely excluded agriculture and the key bargains
were achieved between industrialized countries.62 The Uruguay Round,
by contrast, encompassed a wider range of issues, many of which were
long-standing priorities of low- and middle-income countries.63 Their
interests in lowering barriers to trade in agricultural goods, clothes, and
textiles resulted in a "grand bargain," under which the parties agreed to
adopt strong monopoly protections for copyrights, trademarks, and
patents. 64
Developing states negotiated some flexibilities with respect to
implementation of TRIPS obligations, including articles 7 and 8,
which declared the need for intellectual property law to allow for
development, technology transfer, and measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition.0 Those provisions did not provide a
general exemption from TRIPS implementation, but rather conditioned
those measures on TRIPS compliance. 66 Article 31 of TRIPS allows
for the nonconsensual authorization of patents, but requires that those
authorizations be accompanied by appellate access to national courts
or "higher administrative authorities. '
These protections effectively installed a global regime of
individually enforceable intellectual property rights. As Jerome
Reichmann observed:

61.
Id. art. 61; see id. art. 44 (detailing injunctive relief); id art. 45 (detailing
damages); id. art. 41(4) (describing judicial review procedures).
62.
H.E. Haralambides, M. Westeneng & S. Zou, GATT andIts Effects on Sipping
and Ports, ACADEMIA 3, http://www.academia.edu/2531450/GATT and its Effect on_
Shipping-and.Ports (follow "Get PDF" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
63.
Laurence R. Helfer, Regine Shiting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynanics of InternationalIntellectualProperty Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 20-23
(2004).
64.
Id. at 22; Arvind Subramanian, Medicines, Patents, and TRIPS, IMF 22 (Mar.
2004), http://www.imf org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/03/pdf/subraman.pdf.
65. See TRIPS, supra note 5, arts. 7-8; see also Adelle Blackett, WhKither Social
Clause? Human Rjght, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretiaton,31 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L.
REv. 1, 35-36 (1999) (suggesting reliance on articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS for interpreting issues
of human rights).
66. See U.N. Conference on Trade Dev. & Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.,
35: Council for TRIPS, IPRSONLrNE.ORG 739, 747-48 (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.iprsonline.
org/unctadictsd/docs/6.3TRIPSCOUNCILUPDATE.pdf.
67. TRIPS, supranote 5, art. 31.
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[Developed countries] expect developing countries to implement [their]
obligations concerning domestic judicial and administrative
enforcement of foreigners' intellectual property rights, including
detailed provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights to
counsel, injunctions, damages, and temporary restraining orders. These
provisions mean business.
States party to the agreement are not obliged to spend more
resources on enforcement of intellectual property rights than "law in
general," and thus many individual intellectual property rights holders
may not see a sufficient payoff to invest resources in pursuing
individual civil actions to vindicate property rights. But the economic
sectors most closely tied to agriculture and human health-food,
tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceuticals-are precisely those in which
intellectual property rights holders are likely to attempt to preserve
substantial investments in advertising, research, and development and
those that most significantly affect the interests of low- and middleincome states. 9
3.

ACTA and TPP

TRIPS effectively installed a floor for international intellectual
property protections, a floor that subsequent bilateral and multilateral
trade and investment negotiations have sought to surpass. ACTA7
represents the codification of principles advanced in a number of
initiatives undertaken by developed states to enhance protections for
intellectual property holders beyond what TRIPS achieved. "'
According to the USTR, "[T]he goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher
benchmark for enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary
basis....
ACTA will include commitments in three areas:
(1) strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving enforcement
practices, and (3) providing a strong legal framework for IPR

68. Reichman, supra note 28, at 385.
69. See Brewster, supranote 14, at 40.
70. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Oct. 1, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/economy/i property/pdfs/actal 105_en.pdf [hereinafter ACTA].
71.
See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (andNow Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv.
975, 977-81 (2011).
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' After eleven rounds of
[(intellectual property right)] enforcement."72
in May 2011.13
adopted
was
negotiations, the final ACTA text
ACTA requires parties to the agreement to increase criminal
sanctions for intellectual property right infringement and to adopt
stronger border measures to target illegal trafficking in infringing
goods through customs processes." ACTA requires, under each
parties' available laws, "enforcement procedures ... to permit effective
action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights
covered by [ACTA]. '' Under ACTA, "Each Party shall make available
to [intellectual property] right holders civil judicial procedures
concerning the enforcement of any intellectual property right ... ""
Among those procedures are injunctions,"8 damages,79 other remedies,"
and the collection and preservation of evidence.8 ' These civil
enforcement provisions are not limited to first-party infringers:
72. Press Release, USTR, Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New
Trade Agreement To Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwabannounces- us-will-seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes.
73.
What ACTA Is Abou4 EuR. CoMMIssIoN, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2012/january/tradoc_149003.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). Eight parties have signed
ACTA: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United
States. Id.
74.
SeeACTA, supranote 70, ch. 2, art. 12, §§ 3-4.
75.
Margot Kaminski, Recent Development, The Ongins andPotentalImpact of the
Ant-CounterfeitingTmdeAgreement(ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247,253 (2009).
76. ACTA, supm note 70, ch. 2, § 1, art. 6, 1. ACTA further requires these
procedures to be "fair and equitable [and] not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays." Id. ch. 2, § 1, art. 6, 112.
77.
Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 7, 1; see also Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, Essay, The Impact
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Tmde Agreement on the Knowledge Economy:
The
Accountabilityof the Office of the US Trade Representativefor the Creation of lPEnforcementNorns ThroughExecutive Trde Agreements,35 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 24, 25 (2009),
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf (arguing that
ACTA is overly broad and needs "increased transparency, accountability mechanisms, and
input from civil society").
78.
ACTA, supra note 70, ch. 2, § 2, art. 8, 1. Parties' competent authorities have
the power to order a party to "desist from an infringement [and] prevent goods that involve
the infringement of an intellectual property right from entering into the channels of
commerce." Id
79.
Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 9, 2. Each party must provide its "judicial authorities [the
power] to order the infringer ... to compensate for the injury the [intellectual property] right
holder has suffered as a result of the infringement." Id
80. Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 10,
1-2. The "other remedies" provision can be summed up
as relating to the counterfeit goods, and all materials used in the production of such goods can
be destroyed at the intellectual property right holder's request. Additionally, ACTA authorizes
the party to carry out the disposal or destruction of the goods at the infringer's expense. See
id.
81.
1d ch. 2, § 2, art. 11. Each party must provide the mechanisms, per justified
request of the intellectual property right holder, to order the infringer, or alleged infringer, to
provide all relevant information relating to the infringement or alleged infringement. Id
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Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial authorities
[shall] have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist from
an infringement and, inter ali an order to that party or, where
appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority
exercises jurisdiction, to prevent [infringing] goods ... from entering
into the channels of commerce.
ACTA represents a new restructuring of civil enforcement to
increase the rights of intellectual property holders, which could have
potentially deleterious effects on access to medicines." For example,
because ACTA requires that judicial authorities have the power to issue
injunctions against third parties, any intermediary provider of generic
medicines to developing countries faces potential liability under the
ACTA regime." In the context of access to medicines, the concept of
"intermediary services" may be quite ominous. Services are obviously
provided by Intermediary Service Providers (ISPs), allowing suppliers
to market medicines online and in the pharmaceutical context through
shipping agents. Perhaps more ominously, many others who helped
fund or facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they moved through the
stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could
face intermediary liability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and
funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention,
treatment, and care."

ACTA compliant laws may enable foreign rights holders to target
local industries through threats or use of litigation.86 The force of the
agreement extends beyond its power to shape domestic law because
ACTA will inevitably also form the template for future bilateral
agreements between ACTA and non-ACTA states."
TPP mimics many of ACTA's intellectual property provisions,

although its conclusion is more distant. Congress voted to give the
President fast-track authority to negotiate the agreement, meaning that
82.
Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 8, 1.
83.
See Sean Flynn, ACTA' ConstitutionalProblem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 903, 905 (2011); Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The
Influence of Competing PatentPerspectives,35 FORDHAM INT 'LL.J. 1, 39, 72-76 (2011).
84.
Ho, supra note 83, at 76-78.
85.
Brook K. Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to
Medicines, 26AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 579, 588-89 (2011).
86. Yu, supm note 71, at 1036.
87.
Id. at 1024-25 (referring to the "policy laundering" potential of ACTA).
88. Jane Kelsey, The Trans-PacificParnershipAgreement: A Gold-PlatedGift to the
Global Tobacco Industry?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 240 (2013); Robert Stumberg,
Safeguardsfor Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 384 (2013).
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when TPP is finalized, Congress must either vote "yes" or "no" and
cannot amend it." The text of TPP states that patentability must be
permitted for "new uses of a known product, new methods of using a
known product, or new processes of a known product," suggesting it
would include products that did not improve the known product and
that could encompass, in part, evergreening strategies by
pharmaceutical firmsY The United States and Japan also proposed a
five-year data exclusivity period for the marketing approval of a new
agricultural chemical product, leading to new insecticides, pesticides,
and fungicides enjoying high prices for at least five years before
competitors may use safety and effectiveness data to introduce their
own versions of those products."
C

BilateralandRefionalTrade andInvestment Treaties

More common than broad, multilateral trade instruments like
TRIPS, ACTA, and TPP are bilateral and regional investment and trade
agreements, which contain some of the strongest protections for
intellectual property. 9 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), for
example, take a number of forms and include provisions authorizing
intellectual property rights holders to vindicate claims in national or
international courts or in other dispute resolution fora. Generally, BITs
are negotiated between developed states and developing states.93 BITs
contain provisions guaranteeing investors from one state protections
for their broadly defined "investments." These guarantees may include
fair and equitable or nondiscriminatory treatment,94 free transfer of
89.
Paul Lewis, Barack Obama Given 'Fast-Tmck' Authority over Trade Deal
Negotiations, GuARDIAN (June 24, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://wwww.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jun/24/barack-obama-fast-track-trade-deal-tpp-senate.
90.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 18.37, 2, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text (follow "Intellectual
Property" hyperlink).
91.
See Julia Belluz, How the Trans-PacificPartnerstpCouldDrive Up the Cost of
Medicine Worldwide, Vox, http://www.vox.com/2015/10/5/945451 1/tpp-cost-medicine (last
updated Oct. 5, 2015, 1:00 PM).
92.
U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Intellectual Property Provisions h7
InternationalInvestment Arrnngements U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEBITEIIIAJ2007/1, at 5
(2007) ("A sizable proportion of these [investment] treaties include provisions obligating the
contracting parties to meet [intellectual-property] standards that are more stringent than the
ones found in the TRIPS Agreement.").
93.
See Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investois and
HostStates: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses 31 Nw. J. ITr'LL. & Bus. 261,263 (2011)
(discussing trends in bilateral investment treaty dyads).
94.
See Graham Mayeda, PlayrngFair: The MeaningofFairandEquitableTreatment
in BilateralInvestment Treates, 41 J.WORLD TRADE 273, 274 (2007) (analyzing the standard
of fair and equitable treatment commonly found in investment treaties).
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profits and currency, and, in many cases, payment of compensation
should a host state adopt measures having the effect of direct or
indirect expropriation." The origin and number of BITs in existence is
well documented, although the reasons for their proliferation are
disputed.9 6 At the end of the 1980s, records at the U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development showed 385 BITs, while a decade later, the
number reached 1,857." Current estimates show approximately 3,000
BITs in force. 98
These treaties often give much stronger protection, with fewer
standard exceptions, to intellectual property rights than international
intellectual property agreements, TRIPS, or domestic law. For
example, the standard Swiss BIT protects as investments "copyrights,
industrial property rights (such as patents of inventions, utility models,
industrial designs or models, trade or service marks, trade names,
indications of source or appellation of origin), know-how and goodwill" and requires the counterparty to compensate an investor for
"tak[ing], either directly or indirectly, measures of expropriation,
nationalization or any other measure having the same nature or the
same effect."99 Under the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, an "'investment'
means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or
indirectly... including intellectual property rights" that are accorded
similar rights to arbitration.'" For example, drafters of BITs often
vaguely phrase public health exceptions in the preamble, which
undermines their use as a defense to an investor claim. ' BITs often
provide investors access to one of the major international arbitral
tribunals to vindicate rights under the agreement.'02
95. See, e.g., Switz.-Uru. BIT, supra note 32, art. 5 (providing an example of an
investment treaty's antiexpropriation clause).
96. See Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and Safety in Bilateral
Investment Treaties (pt. 1), 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & PoL'y 235, 236, 239
(2008); Halabi, supranote 93, at 263.
97. Jos6 E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom,42 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 17,23 (2009).
98. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., BilateralInvestment Treaties 1959-1999,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IA/2, at 1 (2000); Robert T. Greig, Claudia Annacker & Roland
Ziad6, How BilateralInvestment Treaties Can ProtectForeignInvestors in the Arab World or
Arab InvestorsAbroad,25 J. INT'LARB. 257, 257 (2008).
99. Switz.-Uru. BIT, supra note 32.
100. 2012 US. Model BilateralInvestment Treaty, USTR 3 (2012), http://www.ustr.
gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%/o2OACIEP%/o20Meeting.pdf.
101. See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of InternationalInvestment and
Domestic HealthProtections-Isa GeneralExceptionsClause a Forced Perspective?,39 AM.
J.L. & MED. 332, 341 (2013).
102. See Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before BilateralInvestment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1550, 1557 (2009). But cf Christophe Dugu6, Dispute Resolution in InternationalProject
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III. INCREASING CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN STRONG
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY
INTERESTS

The strong substantive and enforcement rights that now prevail
for intellectual property rights holders have predictably encouraged the
aggressive policing of those rights. Indeed, large intellectual property
rights-holding constituencies, or coalitions of them, may dedicate
resources toward lobbying member governments to bring formal
diplomatic action at the WTO or elsewhere and, if unsuccessful there,
to bring arbitration or other enforcement actions under bilateral or
regional trade and investment treaties. 3
Complaints from developing countries take two principal forms.
First, the aggressive policing of intellectual property rights
disproportionately affects developing countries' ability to deal with
human rights and public welfare obligations. ° HIV/AIDS, for
example, inflicts its most significant toll in eastern and southern
Africa, uniquely implicating the pricing effect of pharmaceutical
patents on relevant medications.' °5 Similarly, images, brands, and
trademarks that promote product consumption, while arguably benign
in countries with educated, literate populations with access to
inexpensive consumer information, are more pernicious in countries
with high rates of illiteracy.' 6 Second, many of the human and natural
Finance Transactions,24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1072 (2001) (noting that international
financiers often prefer English or New York courts).
103. Sam Foster Halabi, Intemaional TrademarkProtectionand GlobalPublicHealth:
A Just-CompensationRegime for Exproprationsand Regulatory Takings, 61 CATH. U. L.
REV. 325, 334-35, 344, 360 (2012).
104. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12(1),
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Constitution of the World Health Organization, July
22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 ("The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief, economic or social condition.").
105. David Byrne, Is There a Lawyer in the House: The Law of Global Public
Health, 33 J.L. MED. &ETHmcs 19 (Special Supp. 2005); Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 10;
Lee, supra note 52, at 571 ("Major noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) (e.g., cardiovascular
disease, diabetes, cancers, and obesity-related health conditions), now account for nearly
sixty percent of global deaths and almost half (45.9%) of the global burden of disease.
Without intervention, NCDs are expected to contribute nearly seventy-five percent of all
deaths by the year 2020.").
106. Marketing and Promotion of Infant Formula in the Developing Nations, 1978"
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health & Sci Researh of the S. Comm. on Human Res.,
95th Cong. 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter Heatingon MarketingandPromotionof Infant Formula]
(statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and Scientific
Research of the S. Comm. on Human Resources) ("Can a product which requires clean water,
good sanitation, adequate family income and a literate parent to follow printed instructions be
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resources used by innovators to create commercial, scientific, or other
protectable works originate in low- and middle-income countries, yet
these works are priced out of reach of the vast majority of consumers
in those countries." 7

These confrontations came to the fore in the wake of TRIPS's
entry into force. It marked in fundamental ways the breadth and depth
of the new reach of intellectual property protection. In critical product
sectors that affect human health and nutrition, efforts in low- or
middle-income countries (as well as some notable episodes in
wealthier ones) to regulate industries with steep intellectual property
investments-like brands, patents, and trademarks-collided with the
new strength of intellectual property protection driven by bilateral,
regional, and multilateral international agreements.
A.

PatentsandDataExclusivity

Both international trade law and international investment law
have played critical roles in expanding intellectual property protections
for pharmaceutical firms. Leading to the establishment of TRIPS,
many low- and middle-income jurisdictions refused to allow any
pharmaceutical patents, arguing that granting them would erect
barriers to access to medicines for their often large and poor
TRIPS introduced a twenty-year minimum floor for
populations.'
patents, including pharmaceuticals, and required that "undisclosed test
or other data" be protected from "unfair commercial use." 109
Subsequent international agreements not only reinforced that floor, but
also included protections for other aspects of drug development and
approval, including marketing exclusion based on animal and clinical
testing data used as part of a regulatory approval."' Similar protections
were included for seed and other agrochemical products."'

properly and safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage runs in the streets,
poverty is severe and illiteracy is high?"); THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A.
VARAViKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH 23 (2d ed. 2009); Allyn L. Taylor, An International
Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 266 n.49 (1996);
WHO Report on the Global Tobacco Epidemic, 2008, WHO (2008), http://apps.who.
intliris/bitstream/10665/43818/1/9789241596282_eng.pdf.
107. See Taylor, supranote 106, at 276.
108. Nanda & Lodha, supranote 2, at 587; Bajaj & Pollack, supra note 2.
109. TRIPS, supra note 5,art. 39.
110. Seeid
111. Seeid
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Antiretrovirals

By the early 1990s, the population of people living with
HIV/AIDS exploded in Sub-Saharan Africa, quickly comprising the
large majority of the HIV/AIDS-afflicted population worldwide." 2 At
the same time, populations living in Africa tended to have the least
access to relatively rapidly developed (and patented) antiretroviral
treatments." 3 By 2003, approximately twenty million people had died
from AIDS, and another forty million people were infected with HIV"
Africa accounted for two-thirds of the people living with lIlV/AIDS,
despite holding a relatively small percentage of the global
population." 5 Sometime between 1994 and 2001, South Africa
became home to the world's largest population of people living with
HIV/AIDS. 116 While antiretroviral drug treatments had been
developed, patented, and approved as early as 1987, they cost
approximately $1,000 per month when the true scope and severity of
the HIV/AIDS problem in South Africa became clear."7 The South
African government regarded expanding access to patented
medications as part of its responsibility under its constitution and
announced that pharmaceutical firms' pricing strategies made it unable
to do so.1"8 South Africa adopted legislation amending its patent act to
authorize parallel imports and to more steeply regulate available
medicines, notwithstanding existing patent rights."9
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa
and the major global pharmaceutical firms individually sued the
government, alleging that the law violated a number of constitutional
provisions, including uncompensated property takings and
constitutional commitments to honor obligations under international
law generally and TRIPS specifically.2 ' Under the pharmaceutical

112.

Fisher & Rigamonti, supm note 10, at 1-2.

113.

Id.at 2.

114.

Id.

115.

Id at 3.

116.

Id.

117. Id.
118. See Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Special Communication, Do Patents
for AntiretroviralDrugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment La Afica?,286 JAMA 1886,
1888 (2001) (attributing Sub-Saharan Africa's lack of access to antiretrovirals to de facto
barriers such as poverty and high cost).
119. Fisher & Rigamonti, supra note 10, at 6-7.
120. 't Hoen, supra note 9; Pub. Protector of the Republic of S. Afir, Report No 6
(Special Report). Report on the Propnety of the Conduct of Members of the Mimsby and
DepartmentofHealth Relating to Statements in Connection with the Pnces ofMedicines and
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firms' theory, medicine patents relevant to HIV/AIDS drugs were no
different than other pharmaceutical patents. The same intellectual
property principles-exclusivity and monopoly rents in exchange for
investments in innovation-would lead to the same socially optimal
outcomes for HIV/AIDS drugs as for other medicines."'
In 1996, Brazil adopted a "local working" requirement as part of
its industrial property law, which enabled the Brazilian government to
license patented medicines and technology to other firms for
production if the patent was not "worked" in Brazil.' Pharmaceutical
firms, which had exported patented medicines to Brazil but had not
produced them locally, immediately protested the measure and, unlike
in the dispute with South Africa, convinced the U.S. government to
bring a formal dispute at the WTO for violating TRIPS.' Brazil
requested consultations under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), alleging that certain aspects of U.S. patent law,
particularly those obtained with federal support, violated TRIPS. 4
The United States and Brazil terminated their dispute in 2001 in the
wake of the Doha Declaration that they jointly drafted.'2

In 2007,

Brazil granted a compulsory license for Merck's efavirenz after
negotiations over price reductions failed. 6 Merck filed a motion for
injunctive relief, which Brazilian courts rejected. 7
Between 2006 and 2007, Thailand also issued compulsory
licenses for Merck's efavirenz and Abbott's liponavir/ritonavir, noting
that discussions with the firms over prices had lasted over two years. 8
After granting the compulsory licenses, the firms threatened to
Utilisation of Genene Medicines in South Africa, POLITY.ORG.ZA (1994), http://www.polity.
org.za/polity/govt/pubprot/report6.html.
121. See Fisher & Rigamonti, supranote 10.
122. See Lei No. 9,279, de 14 de Maio de 1996, art. 68, DiARuo OFiCIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 15.05.1996 (Braz.).
123. See Permanent Mission of the United States, Request for the Establishment of a
Panel by the United States, Communication dated Jan. 8, 2001 from the Permanent Mission
of the United States to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO, U.N. Doc.
WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9,2001).
124. John S. Odell & Susan K. Sell, Reframing the Issue: The WTO Coalitionon
Intellectual Property and Public Health, 2001, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTREs IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 85, 95-96 (John S. Odell ed., 2006).
125. See Shaffer, Sanchez & Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 417-18.
126. See Carlos M. Correa, The Use of Compulsory Licenses in Latin America, in
COMPULSORY LICENSING, PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD 43 (Reto M. Hilty &
Kung-Chung Liu eds., 2015).
127. Id
128. Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Compulsory Licenses.- Law and Practice in Thailand in
COMPULSORY LICENSING: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD, supra note 126, at

61,65-68.
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withdraw or not register other medicines in Thailand and complained
to the USTR, but they ultimately agreed to lower their prices for the
medications. 2 9
In November 2008, Dutch customs agents seized a shipment of
HLV/AIDS medications manufactured in India and destined for
Nigeria.'3° GlaxoSmithKline had requested the seizure, claiming that
the Indian drug, abacavir, violated its patent rights.' In 2008 and
2009, "Doctors Without Borders found at least 19 shipments of
generic medicines from India to other countries were impounded while
in transit in Europe.""' 2 The disputes between the parties led to formal
action 33at the WTO both by European countries and by Brazil and
1
India.

2.

Cancer, Diabetes, and Heart Disease Medicines

Trade and investment liberalization has promoted the availability
of consumer goods that contribute to poor individual public healthlike processed foods containing high levels of fat, salt, and sugarwithout promoting the access to medicines and other healthcare
infrastructure that wealthier countries maintain to address so-called
"lifestyle" diseases like cancer, diabetes, and heart disease.' Even
when these medicines are available in a given market, international
agreements, including and influenced by TRIPS, push prices higher.'
For example, the US.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement includes
limitations on compulsory licenses and parallel imports. 3 The
costliest TRIPS-plus terms are those that impose "data exclusivity"
separate from patent protection.' Under data exclusivity regimes, a
generic manufacturer is not allowed to use clinical and safety trial data
used with the initial drug application, essentially requiring the generics
applicant to undertake prohibitively expensive clinical trials and
129. Id.
130. Michael Geist, Why Dutch Guards Holding Inian-Made Drugs Bound for
Nigena Sends a Warning to CanadianLegislators,THESTAR.COM (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.
thestar.com/business/2014/08/29/why-dutch-guardsholding-indianmade-drugs-boundfor
_nigena sends_a_warningto-canadian-legislators.htnl.
131. Kuanpoth, supranote 128, at68.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Lee, supranote 52, at 569.
135. All Costs, No Benefits." How TRIPS-PlusintellectudProperlyRules in the USJordan FA Affect Access to Medicines OXFAM INT'L (Mar. 2007), http://www.oxfam.
org/sites/www.oxfam.org/filesall%2costs,%2Ono%20benefits.pdf.
136. Seeid.at2.
137. Seeid
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reimposing the cost to the government or end-user that generics
theoretically exist to save. '
"[T]hese expenditures have required that both public health
systems and individuals pay higher prices for many new medicines
that are needed to treat [diseases] such as [cancer], hypertension,
asthma, diabetes, and mental illness."' 39' For example, new medicines
to treat diabetes and heart disease cost anywhere from two to six times
more inJordan than in Egypt, where there are no agreements imposing
additional intellectual property protections for pharmaceuticals. 40
Access to these medicines has generated conflicts with strong
intellectual property agreements as have medicines that prevent or treat
infectious diseases that disproportionately affect low- and middleincome countries. Along with compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS
drugs in 2007, Thailand also issued a compulsory license for Plavix,
one of the most prescribed heart disease drugs in industrialized
countries."' It also announced compulsory licenses for four patented
cancer medications. The Thai government noted that its decision was
based on the relative burden each disease imposed on the Thai people;
as many or more people in Thailand die from cancer as AIDS.'42 The
Thai licenses prompted immediate retaliation from Abbott, which
withdrew seven medications from the Thai market, and initiated a
more concerted effort by the United States and from European
countries to pressure the Thai government.43'
3.

Vaccines

The development of some vaccines, notably those that protect
against influenza, depends on biological resources in low- and middleincome countries being made available to researchers, organizations,
governments, and pharmaceutical firms in the major industrialized
138. Seeid
139. Id.
140. See id
141. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLoS MED. art.
e1001154, at 1, 6 (2012), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F 10.1371%2F
journal.pmed. 1001154 (follow "Download PDF" hyperlink); see also Ho, supra note 83
(discussing the Plavix patent's aggressive enforcement).
142. Toni Johnson, The Debate over Generic-Drug Trade, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/drugs/debate-over-generic-drug-trade/p 18055 (last updated Aug. 3, 2011);
Program on Info. Justice & Intellectual Prop., Timeline for US-Thailand Compulsory
License Dispute, INFOJUSTICE (Apr. 2, 2009), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
1 /pijip-thailand-timeline.pdf.
143. See WhatACTA IsAbou4 supm note 73.
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countries. Vaccines are one of the most important lines of defense
against the emergence of pandemics.'" Not only are vaccines typically
patented, but so are components of vaccines that make them more
effective.'45 Seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines are possible in
significant part because developing countries share influenza samples
with the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System,
a
even though their populations have not historically received
46
breakthroughs.
other
or
vaccines
resulting
of
benefit
proportionate
The infrastructure and technology for vaccine development is
overwhelmingly located in industrialized, wealthy states.' 47 This
concentration renders many developing states dependent on wealthier
states to manufacture and distribute vaccines in sufficient quantities to
address their needs in the case of disease outbreaks.'48 Yet influenza
pandemics have typically originated in low- or middle-income states
like Cambodia, Indonesia, Mexico, and Vietnam.9 These states must
therefore be willing to share disease samples and biological material
relevant to risk assessment, risk management, disease research, and
vaccine development.'50 When firms patent shared samples to produce
unaffordable vaccines, the willingness to share them is undermined."'
144. Eileen M. Kane, Achieving ClinicalEquality in an Influenza Pandemic: Patent
Realies,39 SETON HALL L. REv. 1137, 1146 (2009).
145. Id. at 1158 ("For example, the use of nonviral chemicals that augment the
immunogenicity of a vaccine-known as adjuvants-is critical. Such compounds allow a
vaccine to include less actual antigen or virus, and thus allow for dose-sparing clinical
approaches that maximize the utility of the available viral components. These compounds
can be patented in isolation and can also appear in patents that claim a vaccine as a specific
combination of antigen and adjuvant.").
146. David P Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, The New International Health
Regulations: An HistoricDevelopment for InternationalLawandPublicHealth, 34 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 85, 89-91 (2006); Kumanan Wilson, Barbara von Tigerstrom & Christopher
McDougall, Analysis, Protecting GlobalHealth Securiy Through the InternationalHealth
Regulations: Requirements andChallenges, 179 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 44,46 (2008).
147. See Kane, supra note 144, at 1148 ("A further complication to vaccine production
is that only a small group of companies with manufacturing capability exist.").
148 See David P Fidler, Policy Forum, Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza
Vaccines. Global Health Diplomacy and the Controvesies Surrounf'ng Avian Influenza
H5N1 andPandemic Influenza HIN, 7 PLOS MED. art. e1000247, at 1, 1-2 (2012), http://
www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F 10.1371%2Fjoumal.pmed. 1000247 (follow
"Download PDF" hyperlink).
149. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 89.
150 Id
151. Kane, supra note 144, at 1153-55 ("In an effort to document the patent landscape
of the field, the WHO has undertaken a project to map where patents have been sought on
any of the relevant H5N1 viral materials. This research demonstrates that a small cluster of
patent applications have been filed on various sequences and proteins of H5N1 and several
patents have been issued, but the report further notes that patent landscaping must continue as
the field matures. The sequence of the H5N1 and novel HINI influenza viruses have been
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In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from the
WHO system, compromising efforts to monitor and produce vaccines
in response to an avian flu outbreak that had not only spread
worldwide, but also threatened to become easily transmissible from
birds to humans and then between humans.'52 Indonesia asserted that
its decision was a response to an Australian company's development of
a vaccine derived from a virus sample that Indonesia provided to the
WHO.'53 The cycle demonstrated the inequities inherent in the global
vaccine distribution system: developing countries provided information and virus samples to the WHO-operated system; pharmaceutical
companies in industrialized countries then obtained free access to such
samples, exploited them, and patented the resulting products, which
the developing countries could not afford."' As David Fidler noted,
"Without access to Indonesia's influenza strains, global surveillance
was jeopardized, as was the refinement of diagnostic reagents and the
development of intervention strategies, which depend on the
information surveillance provides."' 5
In 2009, the outbreak of HINI influenza in Mexico demonstrated
not only that the global surveillance system benefited pharmaceutical
firms, but also that in the case of a real pandemic, those firms'
sponsoring governments could not be relied upon to equitably share
vaccines:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company because it
feared that foreign governments might restrict exports to Canada
because of vaccine shortages within their territories. The Australian
government made it clear to the Australian manufacturer CSL that it
must fulfill the government's domestic needs before exporting vaccine
to the United States. The United States pledged on September 17,
2009, to donate 10% of its vaccine purchases to WHO, but on October
28, US Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius
stated that the United States would not donate HINI vaccine as
promised until all at risk Americans had access, because production
problems had created shortages in the United States.156

determined. The WHO provided notice that genetic sequences from one novel HINI virus
isolate were available on the GISAID database within several days of the first reports of the
outbreak.... Three separate groups of international researchers filed U.S. patent applications
on the DNA sequences of the virus.").
152. Fidler, supra note 12, at 88.
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Id.
156. Fidler, supm note 148, at 1-2.
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Despite clear acknowledgment that the 2009 outbreak originated in
Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there, Mexico "had a
terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine.'
4.

Seeds and Agrochemical Products

Just as spreading intellectual property protections stymied efforts
by developing states to adopt measures against malnutrition and
infectious disease, they also undermined those states' policies toward
food self-sustainability and traditional processes for the preservation of
biological and plant resources.' This confrontation was already well
underway when TRIPS was negotiated, and it was essentially codified
in article 27.3(b), which allows countries to exclude "plants and
animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than nonbiological and microbiological processes" from patentable subject
matter,'59 but requires protection for plant varieties either through
patents or through a suigeneissystem like the International Union for
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), leaving "microorganisms" undefined. 6 °
Patented seeds, tailored pesticides, insecticides, and fungicides, at
a general level, interrupt or displace traditional forms of agriculture
predominant in low- and middle-income countries.'6 ' Philippe Cullet
described the change from traditional forms of agriculture, including
seed exchange and crop rotation, to dependence on patented seeds and
related products in Africa:
The introduction of plant variety protection in African countries is a
novelty for all but a few states. It constitutes a significant departure
from previous practice which generally emphasized the free sharing of
knowledge at all levels. The challenge is further compounded by the
fact that plant variety protection has until now only been introduced in
countries with relatively small but highly industrialized agricultural
sectors.'62
157. Richard Knox, WHO Resolves Impasse over Sharing ofFlu Viruses, Access to
Vaccines, NPR (Apr. 18, 2011, 5:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2011/04/18/1355
19592/who-resolves-impasse-over-sharing-of-flu-viuses-access-to-vaccines (internal quotation
marks omitted).
158. Philippe Cullet, Plant VatietyProtectionin Africa: Towards Compliance with the
TRJPSAgreemen4 45 J.AF. L. 97, 97-98 (2001).
159. TRIPS, supm note 5, art. 27,13(b).
160. Cullet, supm note 158, at 99-100.
161. Id.atlO-11.
162. Id
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From low- and middle-income countries' perspective, implementing
intellectual property protected seeds and agricultural products in
relatively undeveloped agricultural markets essentially redistributes
wealth from farmers to the small number of global seed and
agribusiness firms that dominate the global market. 63' Farmers pay
high prices for seeds and products to treat the crops that grow from
them, while prices for the resulting commodities are pressured lower
by a small number of global food firms." Indeed, as early as 1999four years after TRIPS became international law-African countries
sought to revisit the scope and reach of article 27:i65
The African Group seized the opportunity of the provision and prepared
a strongly worded communication during the preparations for the WTO
ministerial meeting in Seattle [in 1999], which vehemently questioned
the overall provisions of Article 27.3(b). The Group suggested that the
revision of the article should take into account the Convention on
Biological Diversity as well as the FAO International Undertaking.
Insinuating that a review of 27.3(b) could lead to changes in its
substantive nature, the Group highlighted the artificial distinctions that
it made "between biological and microbiological organisms and
processes."'66
B.

Tmdemarks

While patents and data exclusivity have generated the widest
controversies affecting food security, nutrition, and public health
measures, trademarks have caused similar disputes between low- and
middle-income countries and firms with steep investments in symbols,
logos, and distinguishing marks that could mislead or deceive
consumers in those states, many of which suffer high rates of
illiteracy.'67 As a result of the conditions prevailing in many low- and
middle-income countries, product appearance plays a different,
arguably more important, role in consumption, and, therefore, product
image and visuals around point of sale are critical for both commercial
and regulatory objectives.'

163. See Jagjit Kaur Plahe & Chris Nyland, The W70 and Patentingof Life Forms:
PolicyOptionsforDevelopingCountries,24 THMID WORLD Q. 29 (2003).

164. Seeid.at 32-33.
165. See id.
at 34.
166. Id.at 29.
167. Halabi, supra note 103, at 336-39.
168.

Id.
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Infant Formula

While maternal behavior with respect to breastfeeding varies in
industrialized countries, little evidence suggests a significant effect on
infant, maternal, or population health. In low- and middle-income
countries, however, failure to breastfeed has relevant health effects on
infants, mothers, and families.' In areas with low levels of education,
people often fail to properly mix formula and, even when done
correctly, infant formula may introduce contaminants from nearby
water sources.'70 Senator Ted Kennedy phrased the problem this way:
"Can a product which requires clean water, good sanitation, adequate
family income, and a literate parent to follow printed instructions be
properly and safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage
runs in the streets, poverty is severe and illiteracy high?"' 7' In one
tragic episode, parents in Laos confused a red label Bear Brand coffee
creamer (a Nestl6 trademark), the logo of which features a mother bear
holding her cub in the nursing position, for a breast-milk substitute,
notwithstanding written warnings that the product was not intended for
infants for any reason. 2 The confusion resulted in cases of both
malnutrition and death.'73
The WHO estimates that 13% of the 10.9 million deaths of
children younger than five years could be prevented every year if
universal protection, promotion, and support of breastfeeding were
achieved.' Exclusive breast-feeding for the first six months of life is
the number one intervention to save infants' lives.' Breastfeeding
also plays a role in spacing pregnancies where contraception is
unavailable or contraception failures are common.'

169. See World Health Assembly Res. WHA27.43 (May 23, 1974), http://www.who.
int/nutrition/topics/WHA27.43_iycn-en.pdf.
170. Barbara Fienieg, The Position of the InternationalCode on Babyfood Marketing
in WTO, IBFAN AMERICA LATINA Y EL CARME (Sept. 2011), http://www.ibfan-alc.org/
nuestro_trabajo/archivo/codex/artwemos.pdf.
171. Hearing on Marketing and Promotion of Infant Fonnula, supra note 106, at 2
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
172. Hubert Barennes et al., Research, Misperceptions and Misuse of Bear Brand
Coffee Creamer as Infant Food National Cross Sectional Survey of Consumers and
Paediatriciansin Laos, 337 BRITISH MED. J. art. 1379, at 1 (2008), http://www.bmj.con/
content/bmj/337/bmj.a1379.full.pdf.
173. Id.
174. See Gareth Jones et al., HowMany ChildDeaths Can We PreventTis Year, 362
LANCET 65, 69 (2003).
175. See Barennes et al., supra note 172, at 4.
176. Zulfiqar A. Bhutta et al., What Works? Interventions for Maternal and Child
UndernutritionandSurvival, 371 LANCET 417,429 (2008).
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Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, breastfeeding rates in
low- and middle-income countries declined, which the WHO and
governments in those countries attributed to food firms' marketing of
infant formula, other milk products, cereals for infants, vegetable
mixes, and baby teas and juices.'" Those firms' marketing practices
explicitly asserted or implied nutritional and other health equivalencies
with, or superiority to, breastfeeding.'78 Many low- and middle-income
countries adopted national measures to control the marketing of breastmilk substitutes, including the use of images and brands to confuse the
health-related attributes of breast-milk substitute products. 9
In 1983, Guatemala adopted Law 66-83, Law on the Protection
of Breastfeeding, which restricted the ability of breast milk substitute
manufacturers to display images, brands, or trademarks that could lead
its substantially illiterate population to believe that breast milk
substitutes provided an adequate and effective alternative to
breastfeeding during the first six months of infants' lives. 18 The
Ministry of Health implemented the law through Governmental Order
No. 847-87 in 1987.18" Gerber-whose products carry one of the most
recognizable trademarks worldwide, a healthy smiling baby-applied
to introduce a new product line in Guatemala in 1992:'82
[Gerber] requested that the products be registered with the Food &
Drugs Registration and Control Division [an equivalent of the United
States FDA]. The FDRC required that Gerber remove its trademarked
infant image, include a notice that "breastmilk is the best for baby" as
required under the law and further specify the age of the child for which
the products were intended.'83
Gerber responded by pursuing a three-pronged strategy: Gerber
asserted that its products were "complementary" foods under
Guatemalan law and therefore not covered by Laws 66-83 and 841-87
and brought a statutory action under U.S. law to eliminate Guatemala's
trading preferences for effectively "nationalizing" its trademark,
threatening Guatemala's compliance with (still pending) TRIPS

177. See InternationalCode ofMarketing ofBreast-MilkSubstitutes, supra note 24, at
23.
178. Id at 4 n.2; see World Health Assembly Res. WHA31.47 (May 24, 1978),
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/WHA31.47_nut en.pdf.
179 IntematonalCode ofMarketingofBreast-MikSubstutes, supranote 24, at 7.
180. Halabi, supra note 4, at 754.
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id
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provisions."' Gerber argued that article 15 of TRIPS states, "The
nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to be applied
shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the trademark. 1 85 In
addition, article 20 of the proposed agreement provides that "[t]he use
of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements, such as ...use in a special form
or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the
'
goods." 86
The Guatemala Supreme Court of Justice, applying a
strained interpretation of "complementary foods," determined that
Laws 66-83 and 841-87 applied only to locally prepared foods, not to
imported goods.'87 Without explicitly acknowledging the role that the
trade-based agreements played in their construction of the law, the case
"shows... that raising the spectre of the new WTO can be an effective
pressure tool against small countries that want to implement strong
health regulations that may also have negative impacts on commercial
interests.""'
The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines successfully delayed and then earned relief from
comprehensive breast milk labeling restrictions through similar
arguments based in part on the trade-restrictive effect of warnings on
formula containers.' 9 Even in countries that have more successfully
regulated the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, like India, food
firms exploit ambiguities in statutory and regulatory language to
continue
practices that imply the superiority of substitutes over breast
90
milk.'

184. Id
185. TRIPS, supranote5, art. 15, 4.
186. Id.art. 20; Letter from Maio Permuth to Gustavo H6mandez Polanco, Minister
of Pub. Health, Republic of Guat. (Feb. 16, 1994) (on file with author) ("The Gerber
Executive explained that they will fight with all their strength for the application and
enforcement of their industrial property rights in Guatemala and that, at this moment, the
major damages affecting them derive from the fact that they have not been able to sell the
[infant image-labeled] product in Guatemala.").
187. See Fienieg, supra note 170, at 4.
188. Id at 2.
189. See Rene R. Raya, Comment, The PtilippineBreastfeeding Struggle Continues,
371 LANCET 794, 794-95 (2008).

190. See Ben Bouckley, Nestk India Faces Charge for Alleged Infant Formula
Labelling Law Violations, DAIRYREPORTER.COM, http://www.dairyreporter.com/RegulationSafety/Nestle-India-faces-charge-for-a eged-infant-frmua-abeing-law-violations (last updated
Mar. 20, 2012,9:01 AM).
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Tobacco

The burden of smoking-related morbidity and mortality has
shifted dramatically to low- and middle-income countries. Nearly
80% of the more than one billion smokers worldwide live in low- and
middle-income countries, where the burden of tobacco-related illness
and death is heaviest.191 Tobacco consumption is, among other things,
an economic and development issue. Tobacco users who die
prematurely deprive their families of income, raise the cost of health
care, and hinder economic development.'92
For this reason, low- and middle-income countries led some of
the earliest and strongest challenges to marketing efforts by tobacco
firms, which relied heavily on investments in brands, images, and
trademarks.'93 In 1994, South Africa introduced "regulations relating
to the Labelling, Advertising and Sale of Tobacco Products," which
would have required 25% of advertisements and 50% of the front and
back panels of cigarette packs to carry eleven different rotating
warnings. " The then-president and CEO of Philip Morris
International (PMI), William H. Webb, wrote a strongly worded letter
implicitly threatening foreign investment in South Africa and detailing
the violations the law would cause South Africa "under its internal
laws and as a party to The Paris Convention for the Protection of
International Property Rights [including trademark infringement]
assurances to international consumer products companies that their
trademark rights will be respected" and protected from outright
RJR Nabisco focused its lobbying effort "on
expropriation. '
international trade aspects of the potential trademark infringement the
new regulations would create." '96 The final implementing regulations
191. Tobacco, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ (last updated
July 6, 2015).
192. Id.
193. See Memorandum from M.B. Oglesby, Jr., to Charles M. Harper (Aug. 26, 1994),
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ygv66d00 ("The Health Minister of South Africa has
published notice of regulations that would, if implemented, impose the most rigid
requirements in the world for cigarette health warning labels. As proposed, the regulations
would require black and white warning labels on all cigarettes, 25 percent of the front of a
package and 50 percent of the back.").
194. Draft Letter from President & Chief Exec. Officer, Philip Morris Int'l Inc., to
Dir.-Gen., Dep't of Nat'l Health & Population Dev., S. A-fr. (Aug. 17, 1994), http://legacy.
library.ucsf.edu/tid/wdg87eOO/pdPsearch=%22trademark%20regulation%20warning%201ab
els%20africa%22.
195. Draft Letter from William H. Webb, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Philip
Morris Int'l Inc., to Dir.-Gen., Dep't of Nat'l Health & Population Dev., S. Afr. (Aug. 23,
1994), http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/xot45c00.
196. Memorandum from M.B. Oglesby, Jr., to Charles M. Harper, supra note 193.
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halved the coverage of cigarette packs and reduced the number of
rotating warnings. '9'
Between 2008 and 2010, Uruguay implemented a number of
tobacco control measures, including two that addressed the
manipulation of packaging and labeling to shape health perceptions of
tobacco products. First, Uruguay required that pictorial warnings
cover 80% of a cigarette pack's surface. Second, the Ministry of
Health limited the sale of cigarettes to only one variety per brand, the
so-called single presentation requirement.'98 This part of the law
prevents a firm from selling multiple varieties of cigarettes under a
single trademark. For example, PMI, whose most important asset is
the Marlboro brand, could no longer sell Marlboro "Reds," Marlboro
"Greens'" and Marlboro "Blues," leaving "Marlboros" as its only
authorized variety. '99 PMI first challenged the regulations in
Uruguayan courts, seeking an injunction based in part on Uruguay's
Unsuccessful in
revised, TRIPS-compliant trademark law. 20
Uruguayan courts, PMI initiated, through entities it controlled,
arbitration proceedings under Switzerland's BIT with Uruguay.2 ' That
treaty included not only broad definitions of "investor" and
"investment," but also established narrow and toothless exceptions for
public health regulation and even required laws passed with assurance

197. Canadian Tobacco Manufactumrs' Council PreliminaryBrief n Response to
Health Canada1'Blueprint Document INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS LmR. (Jan. 31, 1996), http://
legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/ckd65a99 [hereinafter Response Bie].
198. El Presidente de la Republica Decreta No. 001-1950/2009, de 5 de junio de 2009
(Uru.); Ministerio de Salud Pblica Ord. No. 514, de 18 de agosto de 2008 (Uru.).
199. FTR Holding S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7,
45, 89 (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng-home/
Request for Arbitration,
201 O/PMIvsUruguay/PMI-uruguay/o2Ocomplaint0001 .pdf.
As o f 31 December 2009, Article 3 of Ordinance 514 has resulted in an
approximately 15 per cent decrease in Abal's sales. The hardest hit brand has been
"Marlboro," of which the discontinued "Marlboro Gold," "Marlboro Blue" and
"Marlboro Green (Fresh Mint)" varieties represented 40.5 per cent of total sales in
2008.... It should be noted that Philip Morris affiliates worldwide have invested
significant amounts of time and money in developing a revision of the three subbrands of the Marlboro family. As a result of Ordinance 514, Philip Morris has
been prevented from introducing these innovations in Uruguay and accordingly has
been deprived of the use of its intellectual property.
Id.
200. Matthew C. Porterfield & Christopher R. Byrnes, PhilipMoris v Urumguay. Will
Investor-State ArbitrationSend Restrictionson Tobacco MarketingUp in Smoke 9, INT'L INST.
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 12, 2011), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/philip-morris-vuruguay-will-investor-state-arbitration-send-restrictions-on-tobacco-marketing-up-in-smoke/.
201. Id
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of due process to compensate an investor for an "indirect"
expropriation. 2
Low- and middle-income countries were not the only ones facing
international intellectual property challenges. Contesting Australia's
1992 effort to require tobacco manufacturers to sell cigarettes in plain
packaging, British American Tobacco argued before the Australian
Senate that such a law would violate both the Paris Convention and the
Australian constitution. 3 Persuaded by the tobacco industry, the
Australian government rejected the proposed regulations."° In 1994,
PMI and RJR Reynolds undertook a similarly successful campaign in
Canada, based in significant part on the intellectual property
protection provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and deputized the former USTR to send a letter on their
behalf, suggesting that plain packaging of cigarettes would subject
Canada to an arbitration proceeding for violating NAFTA's intellectual
property chapter.0 5
Low- and middle-income countries have led efforts to regulate
the reach of intellectual property protections for tobacco trademarks
because the health burdens imposed by the consumption that
trademarks promote fall disproportionately on their populations.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS

Scholars, as well as low- and middle-income countries, have
advanced a number of measures to address the perceived imbalance
rendered by the structure of existing agreements, some more practical
than others. Kojo Yelpaala has written a searing indictment of the
international intellectual property regime and has implicitly called for
its ouster:...
It is now widely acknowledged by most observers that TRIPS is a
serious threat to human health security.... Before TRIPS, over forty
202. See Switz.-Uru. BIT, supra note 32, art. 5.
203. See Response Bief,supra note 197; WD & HO Wills (Austl.) Ltd., Submission
to the Industry Commission Inquiry: The Tobacco Growing and Manufacturingkndustrie
INDusTRY DOCuMENTs LIBR. 32 (Jan. 1994), http://legacy.library.ucsfedu/tid/kpk33a99/pdf
(noting that the proposed packaging regulations "amount to a severe infringement of
internationally-registered intellectual property rights").
204. See Adam Harvey, Doctors'PlanTo Put Cigarettesin Plain Wrap Fails,SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, July 24, 1995, at 2 ("Unfortunately, [the proposal] is just not feasible ....
We would have to buy the tobacco companies' trademarks, and that would cost us hundreds
of millions of dollars?' (internal quotation marks omitted))
205. Porterfield & Byrnes, supranote 200.
206. SeeYelpaala, supranote 33, at 63.
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countries offered no patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions.
Such sovereign authority of states has been compromised by TRIPS as
part of the WTO system of agreements.... This exploitation of the
inequalities of bargaining power was undertaken at a time when many
developing countries were ill equipped or unprepared to appreciate all
the implications of TRIPS. °7

On August 26, 2004, Argentina and Brazil sponsored a resolution at
WIPO, calling for a "development agenda" to guide WIPO's activities,
a moratorium on new international agreements that "expand and
strengthen monopolies and further restrict access to knowledge," and
the formation of a "Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology,"
which would essentially roll back expansive protections for copyrights,
patents, and trademarks.2 8
While the more sweeping proposals have not gained much
ground, movements across certain kinds of treaties, or mechanisms
within certain treaties, reflect a consensus that international intellectual
property law has overreached.
Some states are revising or
withdrawing from agreements with strong intellectual property
protections. " Other solutions involve explicit limitations on the
adjudicatory rights private parties enjoy under bilateral or multilateral
instruments.2 1 °

Low- and middle-income states have also started to press for
specific intellectual property regimes in discrete issue areas like seeds
and agricultural technology, vaccines, and other medicines and product
207. Id
208. Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/genevadeclara
tion.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); see Permanent Missions of Argentina and Brazil,
Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WPO,
Communication dated Aug. 26, 2004 from the Permanent Missions of Argentina and Brazil
to the WIPO Secretariat, WIPO, U.N. Doc. WO/GA/3 1/11, annex (Aug. 27, 2004); see also
Yelpaala, supra note 33, at 86 (citing Carlos M. Correa, Implicationsof the Doha Declaration
on the TRJPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO 13-18 (June 2002), http://www.who.
int/medicines/areaslpolicy/WHOEDMPAR_2002.3.pdf) (discussing various available flexibilities in the text of TRIPS that developing countries may exploit); Carlos Correa,
Integmating Public Health Concerns into PatentLegislation in Developing Countries,WHO
22 (Oct. 2000), http://www.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf
(providing
suggestions for developing countries on how to implement TRIPS).
209. See Mercedes Alvaro, Ecuador Plans To Audt Bilateral Investment Treaties,
EuROwvESrOR (Mar. 11, 2013, 2:06 PM), http://www.euroinvestor.com/news/2013/03/11/
ecuador-plans-to-audit-bilateral-investment-treaties/12243637 (discussing Ecuador's withdrawal
from nine BIT agreements); News in Brief South Africa Begins Withdrawing from EUMember BITs, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEv. (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.iisd.
org/itn/2012/10/30/news-in-brief-9/.
210. See Daniela Caruso, PrnvateLaw andState-Making in the Age of Globalization,
39 N.YU. J.INT'L & POL. 1, 50-56 (2006).

2016]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHEL TERS

939

sectors like alcohol, infant formula, and tobacco. Within these issue
areas, what this Article terms "international intellectual property
shelters" are changing or eliminating strong intellectual property rights
guaranteed under other international agreements. From access to
medicines to the protection of biological resources (including seeds) to
the protection of populations from tobacco advertising and other health
threats, a set of international agreements has emerged that either have
jettisoned intellectual property rights in specific issue areas or have
reengineered the way intellectual property protection incentives
function.2" l
A.

The Doha Declaratonon the TRlPSAgreementandPublic
Health

The 2001 Doha Declaration remains the most famous
international intellectual property shelter. Formed to safeguard lowand middle-income countries' access to medicines for HlV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and "other epidemics," the Doha Declaration
established that treatments for diseases affecting low- and middleincome countries deserve different treatment than the typical
intellectual property-based exclusivity and price structure
characteristic of the regime favored by TRIPS."2 Instead, afflicted
countries should, and ultimately do, enjoy greater flexibility to control
monopoly prices that strong intellectual property rights cause. On the
other hand, the Doha Declaration also implied that coercive
mechanisms to acquire or discount non-HI, -tuberculosis, or -malaria
treatments would not be as favorably received."3
Between 1994, when TRIPS was finalized, and June 2001, when
the TRIPS Council opened a special session to discuss access to
medicines under the agreement, the disproportionate effect of
HIV/AIDS on developing countries became clear, as did the contrast
between global pharmaceutical firms' perspective on what TRIPS
211. See discussion ttfi-a Part WA. It is conceivable also to include the Marrakesh
Treaty To Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired
or Otherwise Print Disabled within the class of international agreements described herein.
However, that treaty was based on exceptions already found within the copyright laws of the
drafting and acceding countries, and thus it is far more of a harmonization treaty-as WIPO
treaties tend to be-than a treaty that fundamentally changes the rights copyright holders
enjoy. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org., Historic Treaty Adopted, Boosts Access
to Books for Visually Impaired Persons Worldwide (June 27, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/
pressroom/en/articles/2013/article_00 17.html.
212. SeeTRIPS, supm note 5.
213. See id art. 31 (discussing ways to use vaccines without the patent holder's
authorization).
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accomplished and what developing countries feared. 114 Many
developing states considered the high prices that accompanied
patented medicines and their production processes to frustrate their
constitutional and international human rights obligations to provide
affordable health care to their citizens. The Doha Declaration
essentially created a TRIPS-free zone for government policies aimed at
assuring access to medicines for the three designated diseases and
perhaps other "epidemics."
Paragraph 5 of the 2001 Doha Declaration provided:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be
read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as
expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are
granted.
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it
being understood that public health crises, including those relating
to H1V/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency. 215
Concurrently with the Doha Declaration, Japan introduced the
idea of a global fund for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, which materialized in 2003."l The Doha Declaration by its

terms carved out HLV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as diseases for
which the rewards for medical research and innovation could be
expected to function differently than the patent-and-reward system
pharmaceutical firms envisioned when challenging Brazil's and South
Africa's measures to reduce antiretroviral drug prices. 2"7 Together with
the Global Fund and other international financing mechanisms, the
Doha Declaration redistributed default monopoly rents that pharmaceutical patents previously directed to the major pharmaceutical firms
to generics firms in middle-income countries that (1) possessed the
manufacturing capacity to exploit the new market the Doha
214. See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status ofthe Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HItv. J.L. & TECH.
291,295 (2002).
215. WTO Ministerial Conference, Decarationon the TRIPS Agreement andPublic
Health,U.N. Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20,2001) [hereinafter DohaDeclaration].
216. Seediscussion supra Part Il.B.3.
217. See discussion supm Part HA. 1.
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Declaration opened and (2) enjoyed sufficient influence internationally
to exploit that capacity without alienating states that advocated for
strong pharmaceutical patent rights." 8 Indeed, since 1995, Brazil,
India, South Africa, and Thailand have led in using parallel imports,
TRIPS flexibilities, and compulsory licenses to expand access to
medicines for their own populations, as well as to obtain collective
gains for developing countries."9
It was and is conceivable that the Doha Declaration may have
energized more aggressive compulsory licensing activity outside of the
diseases explicitly named in the agreement. In 2007, Thailand granted
a compulsory license for the heart disease medication marketed as
Plavix.22° Thailand also issued compulsory licenses for four cancer
drugs, the disease burden of which is heavier than HIV/AIDS.2 ' From
the Thai government's point of view, cancer "is no less serious than
W/AIDS."2' In 2012, India granted a compulsory license for kidney
and liver cancer medications, but refused to grant several recent
compulsory license applications. 3 Indeed, since 1995, "[m]ore than
half the compulsory licensing episodes occurred in upper-middleincome countries (including Brazil and Thailand)." ' Retaliatory
measures by both governments and manufacturers have pushed
innovators and governments to the bargaining table. Compulsory
license activity has abated since the Doha Declaration, with the
enhanced bargaining power of developing states leading to more
effective
direct negotiations
between manufacturers
and
governments."' No substantial wave of compulsory licensing activity
has occurred. 6
218. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
219. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
220. SeeKuanpoth, supa note 128.
221. Johnson, suprnnote 142.
222. Id. (quoting Thai. Ministry of Pub. Health & Nat'l Health Sec. Office, The 10
BurningQuestions Regardingthe Government Use ofPatentson the FourAnti-CancerDrugs
h7 Thailan, ESSENTIAL ACTION (Feb. 2008), http://www.essentialaction.org/access/uploads/
2d.Thai.CL.whitepaper.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted)).
223. Bajaj & Pollack, supra note 2.
224. Beall & Kuhn, supranote 141, at 9.
225. See id. at 6; A. Nunn, E. Da Fonseca & S. Gruskin, Changing Global Essential
Medicines Nonns To Improve Access to AIDS Treatment Lessons from Brazil, 4 GLOBAL
PuB. HEALTH 131 (2009); Elliot Hannon, How an Indian Patent Case CouldShape the Future
of Genetic Drugs, WORLD TME (Aug. 21, 2012), http://worldtime.com/2012/08/21/how-anindian-patent-case-could-shape-the-future-of-generic-drugs/
("The Indian patent law,
however, set the bar much higher than in the U.S. 'India has time and again really expressed a
strong preference for public health concerns over private patent rights,' says Shamnad
Basheer, a professor of intellectual property law at the National University of Juridical
Sciences in Calcutta."); Kelley Lee, Luiz Carlos Chagas & Thomas E. Novotny, Policy
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So what did the Doha Declaration do?22' It is difficult to answer
the question without also analyzing the mushrooming of global
medicines funding institutions that accompanied the Doha
Declaration. The Doha Declaration certainly pushed patent-holding
firms to the negotiating table with middle-income countries that
possessed the manufacturing capacity to make compulsory licensing
threats credible and gave those countries particular negotiating
leverage in the discrete disease categories named by the Doha
Declaration-HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. At the same time,
however, the establishment of the Global Fund, Gavi (which has
strongly suggested that it would finance an HIV vaccine should one be
developed),228 and the increase in health aid both to individual
ministries of health and indirectly through the Global Fund, such as the
U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),22' the
rents pharmaceutical patent holders would have obtained under the old
system have been partially replaced by the incentive to win
opportunities through international funding mechanisms. Thus the
major pharmaceutical firms have developed extensive relationships
with ministries of health in less developed countries, and
pharmaceutical pricing is more often undertaken collaboratively.
B.

The ProposedMedica/ResearchaadInnovaton Treaty

The controversies leading up to the Doha Declaration prompted a
broader movement supporting an international agreement to
restructure intellectual property incentives in the access-to-medicines
context. To be sure, part of the larger problem was that monopoly
rents supported by patents, trademarks, trade dress, and data
Forum, Brazil and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Global Health
Diplomacy as So# Power, 7 PLoS MED. art. e1000232, at 1, 1-3 (2010), http://joumals.
plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.l000232 (follow "Download PDF"
hyperlink).
226. See Peter Leung, IndiaRejects Another CompulsoryLicence, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP. (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.mianagingip.com/Blog/3273950/India-rejects-anothercompulsory-licence.html.
227. See Beall & Kuhn, supra note 141, at 3-7 (discussing the Doha Declaration's
general impact); Strengthening Tanzana Health Systems with a Public-Pn'vatePartnership,
CTR. FOR GLOBAL HEALTH & DIPL., http://www.cghdorg/index.php/global-health-partnerships-

and-solutions/public-private-partnerships/39-strengthening-tanzanias-health-systems-with-apublic-private-partnership (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (discussing the Doha Declaration's
impact in Tanzania).
228. About Gav; the Vaccine Alliance, GAVI, http://www.gavi.org/about (last visited
Feb. 20, 2016).
229. About PEPFAJ, U.S. PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY PLAN FOR AIDS RELIEF,
http://www.pepfar.gov/about/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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exclusivity rendered medicines like antiretrovirals, cancer treatments,
and diabetes-control drugs out of reach for low- and middle-income
countries. But a similar, if not larger, part of the problem was that drug
innovation and development did not occur for Type 1I and Type III
diseases that primarily afflicted low- and middle-income countries. 3
The diseases for which the market would likely be paltry attracted little
research and development funding.'
In 2005, Kenya submitted a resolution to the WHO's Executive
Board requesting the creation of a group of member states to discuss a
new global framework on medical research and development. 232 In
January 2006, Brazil joined the resolution as a cosponsor,233 requesting
such a framework.234 In May 2006, the World Health Assembly
(WHA) adopted Resolution 59.24-Public Health, Innovation,
Essential Health Research and Intellectual Property Rights-which
called for an intergovernmental working group to study the
relationship between intellectual property rights, other forms of
financing, and the global problem of diseases unlikely to attract purely
private-sector attention. " In 2012, the WHO's Consultative Expert
Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and
Coordination (CEWG) published Research and Development to Meet
Health Needs in Developing Counties: Strengthening Global
Financing and Coordination, which called for a binding framework
treaty to address innovation and research capacity in developing

230. WHO Secretariat, Defming Disease Types, J7 and Iff, WHO 2 (Nov. 14,2012),
http://www.who.int/phi/3-background-cewgagenda item5_disease-typesfinal.pdf.

231. Consultative Expert Working Grp. on Research & Dev.: Fin. & Coordination,
Research and Development To Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries: Strengthenbng
GlobalFinancingand Coordination,WHO 1-2 (Apr. 2012), http://www.who.int/phi/CEWG_

Report_5.April_2012.pdf (discussing the progress of the work of the Consultative Expert
Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination). Multiple
theories of intellectual property protection might apply to the same good. For example, a
pharmaceutical patent might apply to a given compound, while trademark or trade dress
protection might apply to the appearance of a given pill. See Jeremy A. Greene & Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Wy Do the Same DrugsLook Different? Pills, Tade Dress,andPublicHeah
365 NEw ENG. J.MED. 83, 83-85 (2011).

232. Julia Heydemann, Getting Its Act Together? EUActormess in Negoatons of
'Access to Medicines" at the GAT, WTO, WHO and UN, in NETWORKS OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIE 287, 299-300 (Lorenzo Mechi et al. eds., 2014).
233. Id.at 300.
234. Id.

235. SeeWorld HealthAssembly Res. WHA59.24, supranote 19.
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countries and to design a system to promote development of
treatments through incentive and other financing mechanisms."'
The CEWG's report extensively covered the obstacles strong
intellectual property protections pose for addressing medical research
and development needs in developing countries.2" The report squarely
addressed existing intellectual property instruments, viewing a medical
research and innovation "convention not as a replacement for the
existing intellectual property rights system but as a supplementary
instrument where the current system does not function" and
emphasizing the need for research and development breakthroughs to
be shared with other researchers, free 23from
the constraints intellectual
8
property protections normally impose.
For example, for Type I and Type III diseases that disproportionately affect populations in developing countries, the CEWG
recommends a binding international treaty that provides for open
innovation models in which (1)research and development costs are
covered by public or philanthropic sources and research results are
made available in the public domain; (2) funders or research
organizations impose licensing conditions that permit nonexclusive
licensing or prescribe a low target price for a product; (3) advance
market commitments or prize fimds that involve separate payments
compensate for the costs of research and development, prescribing
either predetermined product prices at a low level or permitting
competitive manufacture of developed products; and (4) more
comprehensive schemes envisage wholesale replacement of the
intellectual property innovation and exclusivity system.239
Deep divides still stand in the way of the formation of the
agreement. Brazil, Kenya, and the many low- and middle-income
countries that stand to gain from a treaty allocating more resources to
research into neglected diseases and diluting intellectual property
rights in general support the proposed treaty. European countries,
especially those with large pharmaceutical
firms, have

236. Press Release, Health Action Int'l Eur., Long-Awaited Steps Towards Affordable
Access and Needs-Driven Research and Development (June 17, 2013), http://haiweb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Long-awaited-Steps-Towards-Affordable-Access-and-Needs-drivenResearch-and-Development-2013.pdf. The proposed treaty has been called a variety of
names, including the Essential Health and Biomedical R&D Treaty, the Medical Research
and Development Treaty, and the Biomedical R&D Treaty. Id
237. World Health Assembly Res. WHA59.24, supm note 19.
238. Id
239. Id.
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overwhelmingly opposed it.24° In 2013, the United States proposed a
series of demonstration projects that might bridge the current, deep
divides between member states over the treaty's terms. 1
C

The WHO, PandemicInfluenza PreparednessFramework

Indeed, the kind of regime envisioned by the medical research
and innovation treaty exists to some degree in the limited context of
pandemic influenza. Indonesia's refusal to share avian flu samples on
the basis of inequities in the global vaccine development and
distribution system, along with the catastrophic potential of the 2009
HINI episode, encouraged pharmaceutical firms, the WHO, wealthy
countries, and poor ones to address the balance between intellectual
property rights in shared biological resources and the products
resulting from that sharing system." 2
In 2007, the WHA commenced a series of negotiations over
"sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other
benefits" in light of Indonesia's refusal to share critical virus
samples. 243 Disagreements over the extent to which vaccine
manufacturers' intellectual property rights should be diluted or
eliminated erected critical barriers to early negotiations. " The failure
of H5N1 to become a pandemic influenza episode reduced the
significance of Indonesia's refusal to participate in sample sharing. In
2009, however, the emergence of H1N1 in Mexico and the United
States 45 rendered the negotiations more urgent.
As a result of these episodes, developing countries, led by
Indonesia, pressed both the WHO and developed states to conclude an
agreement on equitable access to pandemic vaccines. In 2011, the
WHO Open-Ended Working Group of Member States on Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) finalized an agreement in which
developing countries agreed to routinely share mutating flu virus

240. Martin Enserink, WHO Panel Weighs Radical Ideas, 314 SCIENCE 1373, 1373
(2006).
241. Press Release, Health Action Int'l Eur., supra note 236.
242. See Fidler, supra note 12, at 88-94.
243. World Health Assembly Res. WHA60.1 (May 18, 2007), http://apps.who.int/
gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHASSA WHA60-Recl/E/reso-60-en.pdf.
244. David P Fidler & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Commentary, The WHO Pandemic
Influenza PreparednessFramework A Milestone in Global Governance for Health, 306
JAMA 200, 200-01 (2011).

245. See The 2009 HINI Pandemic. Summary Higlights, Apnil 2009-Apuil 2010,
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hlnlflu/cdcresponse.htm (last updated June 16,2010).
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samples in exchange for a series of measures taken under the auspices
of the newly formed Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework." 6
Under the Framework, major pharmaceutical manufacturers
retain their ability to access samples shared through the WHO's Global
Influenza Surveillance and Response System, but now firms using the
system must contribute towards half the cost of its maintenance
(approximately $30 million annually) and must promise to share either
intellectual property, products developed through use of the system, or
other medical countermeasures critical to pandemic response."' For
manufacturers of vaccines and/or antivirals, the recipient shall commit
to at least two of the following options:
Al. Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to
WHO.
A2. Reserve at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production at
affordable prices to WHO.
A3. Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine
for the pandemic to WHO.
A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine
for the pandemic at affordable prices.
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on
mutually agreed terms that should be fair and reasonable
including in respect of affordable royalties, taking into account
development levels in the country of end use of the products, on
technology, know-how, products and processes for which it holds
IPR for the production of (i) influenza vaccines, (ii)adjuvants,
(iii) antivirals and/or (iv) diagnostics.
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing
countries or grant to WHO royalty-free, non-exclusive licenses on
IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the production of pandemic
influenza vaccines, adjuvants, antivirals products and diagnostics
needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to
manufacturers in developing countries on appropriate terms and
conditions and in accordance with sound public health
principles.4 8
Because a subsequent pandemic influenza episode has yet to emerge to
test the system, it is too early to know whether the Framework will
achieve its objectives. Key terms like "pandemic," "real-time," and
246. Sangeeta Shashikant, 'Milestone" Vkusenefit-Sharing Agreement with
Shortcomings, GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH, http://www.ghwatch.org/sites/www.ghwatch.org/
files/PIPsangeeta.doc (last updated May 6,2011).
247. SeeFidler & Gostin, supm note 244, at 201.
248. PandemicInfluenza PreparednessFramewor, supra note 18, at 34.
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"affordable" are left undefined, at least inthe core agreements, and
those terms caused substantial problems during the WHO's
negotiation, procurement, and deployment of pandemic vaccine in
2010.24 Nevertheless, the Framework can be plausibly understood to
be the result of low- and middle-income countries changing the
international intellectual property regime both ex ante (through access
to materials for research and development) and ex post (through
sharing of intellectual property-generated products).
D

The Conventon on BiologicalDiversity

While often tied to its sibling treaty, the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change (and less so the U.N. Convention To
Combat Desertification) as an outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit in
Rio de Janeiro, the Convention on Biological Diversity not only
endeavored to create worldwide agreement on the conservation of
biodiversity and sustainable practices for plant genetic resources, but it
also established a general regime for "access and benefit sharing" of a
kind arguably at odds with its other two objectives; however, it proved
fruitful for finding legal bases to shape or curtail intellectual property
rights. " ' Indeed, in its dispute with the WHO and wealthy countries in
2007, Indonesia cited the Convention on Biological Diversity as one of
its legal justifications for withholding H5N1 virus samples. 5 ' After
the Convention went into force, it has served as a primary focal point
for low- and middle-income countries to revisit and advocate for
amendment of TRIPS, as well as to develop subsequent treaties that
target intellectual property protections in a range of ways. 2" The
Convention's goal of "access and benefit sharing" includes both plant
genetic resources as well as the relevant technology associated with
their development,253 and it specifically ties terms of access to
intellectual property rights, providing that "patents and other
249. Seeid
250. See H. David Cooper, The InternationalTreaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
FoodandAgriculture, 11 REv. EuR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENvTL. L. 1, 4-8 (2002).

251. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 244, at 200; see also Michiel Korthals & Brain
De Jonge, Two DifferentEthicalNotions ofBeneflt Sharing of Genetic Resources and Their
Implications for Global Development 28 NEw GENETICS & Soc'Y 87, 89 (2009) (attributing
the decline in international transfers of genetic resources to the ratification of the Convention
of Biological Diversity).
252. John Linarelli, Tmaty Governance, Intellectual Property and Biodversiy, 6
ENvTL. L. REV. 21, 26-29 (2004).
253. Jonathan Carr, Comment, Agreements that Divide: TRIPS vs. CBD and
Proposalsfor MandatoryDisclosure of Source and COngin of Genetic Resources in Patent
Applications, 18 J.TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 131, 133 (2008).
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intellectual property rights may have an influence on the
implementation of [the Convention, and thus parties] shall cooperate in
this regard subject to national legislation and international law in order
to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to
its objectives.""
The Convention asks parties to take legislative, administrative, or
policy measures "as appropriate" to implement the Convention's
goals." This has led to broad diversity in implementation strategies
between nations,25 with many seeking to protect their resources, rather
than facilitating access and benefit sharing, and others essentially
using the Convention to obtain favorable terms for commercial
exploitation, arguably in tension with the Convention's conservation
objective. "7 This latter phenomenon puts signatory governments and
farmers at odds in several different ways because while the biological
resources belong to the sovereign government, farmers' rights are not
addressed in the text of the Convention.'
The Convention relies on bilateral contracts between parties and
the linear movement of plant genetic resources from the field to
commercial development, using negotiation with the sovereign state to
facilitate access and sharing of benefits. "9 This method treats plant
genetic resources as if they are private goods and opens possibilities
for arrangements that modify intellectual property rights."
In
addition, the Convention encourages parties to disclose the country of
origin of plant genetic resources in their applications for intellectual
property rights."'

254. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 16, 5, June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 103-20, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
255. Bernard Le Buanec, Plant Genetic Resources and Freedom To Operate, 146
EUPHYTICA 1, 3 (2005).
256. Id.
257. Korthals& De Jonge, supmnote 251, at 89.
258. See Edgar Tabaro, Food Secuitv and Access to Plant Genetic Resources: An
Analysis of the Multilateral System of Access and Benefit Shanng, 15 MuRocH U.
ELECTRONIC J.L. 212, 217 (2008).

259. Le Buanec, supm note 255, at 3.
260.

SeeKorthals & De Jonge, supra note 251, at 89.

261. See Cary Fowler & Toby Hodgkin, Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture: Assessing Global Availability, 29 ANN. REV. ENvTL. RESOURCES 143, 167
(2004).
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International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (International Seed Treaty)

The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (International Seed Treaty) in many ways embodies a
disagreement between North American, European, and Japanese
governments and low- and middle-income countries that begins with
article 27 of TRIPS. Low- and middle-income countries always
maintained that article 27 was inconsistent with the Convention on
Biological Diversity. The Treaty was adopted on November 3, 2001,
after a seven-year negotiation process262 and entered into force in
2004.263 The International Seed Treaty is a protocol adopted pursuant
to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
(Undertaking) and the Convention on Biological Diversity, intended to
update the Undertaking and make it legally binding. "
The Undertaking, adopted in 1983,265 is an international instru-

ment aimed at encouraging international cooperation in the
conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources.266 It
originally advocated the view that plant genetic resources are a
common heritage of humanity and should be freely available without
restriction.267 This view was later qualified by several resolutions
which amended the Undertaking. Resolution 4/89 recognized plant
breeders' and farmers' rights, subjecting free availability to property
rights.1 8 However, these "rights" are merely recognition without
force-no individual rights are enumerated in the resolution. 29
Resolution 3/91 went a step further by recognizing the sovereign rights
of nations over plant genetic resources within their territories.27°
In an effort to update the goals of the Undertaking and the
Convention on Biological Diversity and to make them legally binding,
negotiations on the International Seed Treaty began in 1994.27 ' These
262. SeeCooper, supra note 250, at 1.
263. The FAO Seed Trea(y: From Farmers'Rightsto Breeders'Privileges,GRAN 21
(Oct. 2005), https://www.grain.org/article/entries/585-the-fao-seed-treaty-from-farmers-rightsto-breeders-privileges (follow "Download PDF version" hyperlink).
264. Cooper, supm note 250; Lauren Winter, Note, Cultivating Farmers' Rights:
Reconciling Food Secunity, rndgenous Agriculture, and TRIPS, 43 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L.
223,241 (2010).
265. Cooper, supra note 250, at 1.
266. Tabaro, supra note 258, at 214 n.11.
267. Id.at 214.
268. Id.at 216.
269. Winter, supm note 264, at 242.
270. Tabaro, supra note 258, at 216.
271. Id.at217.
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included matters of extensive debate, such as access and benefit
sharing, farmers' rights, and financial resources, but an informal
meeting of negotiators in Switzerland overcame these differences in
1999.272 The parties agreed on which crops to include on the Treaty's
Annex 1 list and compromised on intellectual property rights in April
2001.273 The International Seed Treaty does not include plant genetic
resources not on the Annex 1 list, which remain under the legal
framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, as do resources
accessed for nonagricultural purposes. 74 In June 2001, parties agreed
"'
to a multilateral system for access and benefit sharing.27
Two major provisions of the International Seed Treaty affect
intellectual property rights. First, the Treaty recognizes farmers'
rights.2 11 Second, the Treaty creates a multilateral system for access
and benefit sharing.27 Article 9 of the Treaty enumerates three
elements of farmers' rights: (1)the protection of relevant traditional
knowledge, (2) the right of farmers to participate equitably in sharing
benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic resources, and
(3) the right of farmers to participate in decision making at national
levels. 8 Article 9 also states, "Nothing in this Article shall be
interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange
and sell farm-saved seed/propagating material, subject to national law
and as appropriate."27 ' Article 15 of the Treaty recognizes that states
hold sovereign authority over their own natural resources.280 As with
the Undertaking, these provisions essentially create intellectual
property rights held by farmers and nations over plant genetic
resources that previously did not exist.28 '
The Treaty's multilateral system for access and benefit sharing
also affects intellectual property rights. The multilateral system is
272. Cooper, supranote 250, at 1-2.
273. See id.
at 2.
274. Fowler & Hodgkin, supra note 261, at 167.
275. Cooper, supranote 250, at 2.
276. Id.at 3; see also Xiaoyong Zhang, Access to Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture and Benefit-Sharing in China: Legal Framework, Current Practicesand
Future Developments, 21 REv.EuR.COMMUNITY & INT'L ENvTL. L. 137, 137 (2012) (noting
that if China agrees to the Treaty, farmers would gain access to project funding, allowing for
conservation and sustainable use).
277. Cooper, supra note 250, at 5-8.
at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.at 4 (quoting InternationalTreaty on Plant Genetics Resources for Foodand
Agriculture, FOOD &AGRic. ORG. U.N. (2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/01 1/i0510e/iO510e.
pdf).
280. Id.
281. SeeTabaro, supmnote 258, at 216-17.
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primarily composed of two parts: the Annex 1 list of plant genetic
resources282 and the Material Transfer Agreement (Agreement).283
Annex 1 lists thirty-five specific crops to which the Treaty applies."
Access to these resources is limited to those under the management
and control of the public domain or in the gene banks of international
institutions.285 However, the Treaty does require parties to take
measures to encourage natural and legal persons in their jurisdictions
to grant access to privately held plant genetic resources. 8 '
The Agreement provides for facilitated access to plant genetic
resources, benefit sharing mechanisms of the Treaty, and any
associated intellectual property rights."7 Facilitated access is subject to
both intellectual property rights and plant breeders' rights, and access
to material under development remains under the discretion of the
developer. 28 In exchange for facilitated access, recipients are
prohibited from seeking intellectual property rights on plant genetic
resources in the form received from the multilateral system, including
parts and components of such resources." 9
Facilitated access itself is a benefit under the International Seed
Treaty, but the Treaty and the Agreement also provide for the sharing
of monetary benefits, " improved plant genetic resources, 29 ' and
technology and information.12 Annex 2 of the Agreement triggers
monetary benefits when a recipient commercializes a product from the
plant genetic resources received and when that product is not available
without restriction to others for further research and breeding
purposes.9 This provision effectively discourages the use of patents,
other intellectual property rights, or other contractual or technological
methods that achieve the same effect.9
After the expiration of any intellectual property rights, recipients
are encouraged to place a sample of their products into a collection
282. Cooper, supra note 250, at 5.
283. Id.at 7-8.
284. Id at 5.
285. Id at 6.
286. Id
287. StandardMaterialTransferAgreemen4 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. pmbl. (Nov. 3,
2001), tp://ftp.fao.org/ag/agp/planttreatyagreements/smta/smtAe.pdf.
288. Cooper, supra note 250, at 7.
289. Id. at 7-8.
290. Id.
291. See StandardMaterialTransferAgreement supra note 287, arts. 6.7-.9.
292. See Cooper, supra note 250, at 4, 9; Standard Material Transfer Agreement, supra
note 287, art. 6.9.
293. See StandardMateiil TransferAgreemen4 supra note 287, annex 2.
294. Cooper, supra note 250, at 9-10.
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that is part of the multilateral system."' In addition, they are also
required to share all nonconfidential information about the improved
plant genetic resources that result from the recipient's research and
development processes.29 ' Recipients who commercialize a product
are also encouraged to make monetary contributions, although they are
not presently required to do so. 97 These measures are intended to
establish and strengthen conservation and scientific research in
developing countries."'
In response to the Treaty, some nations have proposed or adopted
liberal legislation to protect the rights of farmers.299 African Model
Legislation suggests that countries recognize and protect farmers'
varieties and breeds that do not meet the criteria of distinction,
uniformity, and stability 300 traditionally required for intellectual
property protections, such as plant breeders' rights."' It also provides
farmers with the right to participate in decision making on matters
related to conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources;
the right to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seeds both
individually and collectively; and the right to use protected breeders'
varieties to develop new farmers' varieties." 2 Under this model
legislation, farmers still may not sell farm-saved seeds of a breeders'
protected variety at commercial sales."
India has likewise developed liberal legislation protecting
farmers' rights. " India adopted the Protection of Plant Varieties and
Farmers' Rights Act in 2001 "5This Act permits farmers to protect and
recognize farmers' varieties, which are defined broadly as "ha[ving]
been traditionally cultivated and evolved by the farmers in their fields;
or [are] wild relative[s] or land race[s] of a variety about which
farmers possess common knowledge."3 As with the African Model
Legislation, farmers are permitted to save, use, sow, resow, exchange,
295. StandardMatenialTransferAgreemen supra note 287, art. 6.9.
296. Id.
297. Id.art. 6.8.
298. Cooper, supra note 250, at 9.
299. Mohamed Ali Mekouar, Treaty Agreed on Agrobiodiversity The International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for FoodandAgriculture,32 ENVL. PoI' & L. 20, 23-24
(2002).
300. Id at 23.
301. Winter, supra note 264, at 231.
302. Mekouar, supra note 299, at 23-24.
303. Id at 24.
304. Id
305. Id at 23.
306. Id at 24.
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share, or sell farm produce and protected varieties of seeds as long as
the seeds are not sold commercially.3"' These provisions allow
countries like India and Zambia to protect farmers commercially by
granting them intellectual property rights, promote conservation and
stewardship by the farming community, and limit the power of
intellectual property rights held by third parties." 8
Other countries have failed to implement legislation that
adequately protects farmers3" or implements the Treaty."' This is
largely due to the fact that the International Seed Treaty does not
actually require parties to legally recognize farmers' rights to freely
exchange and use harvested seeds."' The fact that several of the
world's largest holders of plant genetic resources, such as the United
States, China, Russia, and Japan, have not ratified the Treaty limits the
overall effectiveness of the Treaty."' As a result, they have not passed
legislation to effectively share and receive benefits through the
multilateral system. 13
Aside from the failure of key states to ratify and others to
implement legislation, the International Seed Treaty's text itself
includes weaknesses that open its access and benefit provisions to
vulnerabilities against international intellectual property agreements. "
The provision prohibiting recipients from taking out intellectual
property rights on plant genetic resources in the form received from
the multilateral system fails to define what "in the form they are
received" means or what degree of alteration or change is required to
allow recipients to seek intellectual property rights. 5 Some countries
interpret the language to mean that the Treaty will not impinge on
national intellectual property rights, laws, or policies."' The EU
understands that parts and components that are subject to innovation
can be protected by intellectual property rights.3 7 Developing
307. Id
308. Winter, supra note 264, at 249.
309. Nurcan Atalan-Helicke & Becky Mansfield, Seed Governanceat the Intersection
of Multiple Global and Nation-State Priorities: Modernizing Seeds in Turkey, GLOBAL
ENvTL. POL., Nov. 2012, at 125, 137-38.

310. Zhang, supra note 276.
311. Atalan-Helicke & Mansfield, supra note 309, at 137.
312. Zhang, supra note 276, at 137.
313. Fowler & Hodgkin, supranote 261, at 169.
314. See Laurence R. Heifer, IntellectualPropertyRights and the InternationalTreaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, 97 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 33, 35
(2003).
315. Tabaro, supra note 258, at 221-22.
316. Id
317. SeeLe Buanec, supranote 255, at 5.

954

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 90:903

countries, on the other hand, interpret this provision as per se
disfavoring applications for intellectual property rights that could
restrict access to plant genetic resources.31
The International Seed Treaty is new, and therefore no consensus
exists as to whether it has been effective in achieving its objectives or
limiting the assertion of intellectual property rights over plant genetic
resources.319 However, at least in the arena of advancing farmers'
rights, it does seem to have been somewhat successful in countries,
such as India and Zambia, that have enacted legislation granting
farmers broad rights to use, save, exchange, and sell seeds.32
2.

The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization

The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization
(Nagoya Protocol) aimed to encompass the broader universe of drugs,
medical therapies, agrochemical products, vaccines, and other
products derived from genetic resources not regulated by other
international instruments (although its relationship with the WHO
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework is disputed). 2 ' In short,
the Nagoya Protocol, another agreement formed subsequent to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, regulates access to genetic
resources in party states and esablishes mechanisms for "fair and
equitable sharing
of benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic
322
resources."
Countries adopting legislation or regulation pursuant to the
Nagoya Protocol ensure that access to any genetic resources within the
territory of that country is conditioned on prior informed consent not
only of the country of origin, but also on access being "[iln accordance
with domestic law" and on the consent of indigenous and local
communities.2 Moreover, once access to genetic resources results in a
commercially viable product:
318. Cooper, supra note 250, at 8-9.
319. Atalan-Helicke & Mansfield, supn note 309, at 137.
320. Winter, supra note 264, at 249-50.
321. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
adopted on Oct. 29, 2010, https://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf
[hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].
322. Id art. 1.
323. Idart.6.
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[B]enefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as
subsequent applications and commercialization shall be shared in a fair
and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that is the
country of origin of such resources or a Party that324has acquired the
genetic resources in accordance with the Convention.
The precise nature of benefit sharing, both monetary and
nonmonetary, is left to the states themselves to negotiate with those
who generate commercialized products.
South Africa's Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and
Benefit-Sharing, for example, require firms to obtain a permit from
the government if they intend to use South African genetic resources
for research or patenting." These permits can only be obtained with a
benefit-sharing agreement with relevant stakeholders." South Africa
integrates this system with its patent application system as well, such
that patent applications must identify indigenous biological resources
or forms of traditional knowledge leading to the patentable subject
matter.3"7 As of 2016, only nineteen countries and the EU submitted
legislative, administrative, or policy measures in furtherance of the
Nagoya Protocol, but its potential to shape
the scope of intellectual
21
clear.
is
patents,
especially
rights,
property
Indeed, the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their
Utilization (Bonn Guidelines), a set of voluntary guidelines issued
subsequent to the Convention on Biological Diversity, but before the
Nagoya Protocol, recommended the following provisions for contracts
between sovereign states and commercial entities:
(a) Regulating the use of resources in order to take into account
ethical concerns of the particular Parties and stakeholders, in
particular indigenous and local communities concerned;
(b) Making provision to ensure the continued customary use of
genetic resources and related knowledge;

324. Id.art. 5.
325. See Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing, GN R.138 of
GC 30739 (8 Feb. 2008) (S. Afr.).
326. Idat22.
327. See Neil R. Crouch, Errol Douwes, Maureen M. Wolfson, Gideon F Smith &
Trevor I. Edwards, Science Policy, South Aftica's Bioprospecting, Access and BenefitSharngLegislation: CurrentReaities, Future Complications,and a ProposedAlternative,
104 S.AFR. J. SC. 355, 357 (2008).
328. See NationalRecords: Access & Benefit Sharing Clearing-House,https://absch.
cbd.int/searchlnational-records/MSR (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
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Provision for the use of intellectual property rights include joint

research, obligation to implement rights on inventions obtained
and to provide licences by common consent;
(d) The possibility of joint ownership of intellectual property rights
according to the degree of contribution.329
The Bonn Guidelines similarly suggest that parties might condition
transfer of material on a promise not to seek intellectual property
rights at all.33°

Countries like India and Peru have used the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol to aggressively police
both access based on informed consent and benefit sharing with
parties and indigenous communities and to share its policies
internationally. The Indian government has created a Traditional
Knowledge Digital Library, which stores Indian traditional medicine
treatments and is accessible to patent offices around the world. 3'
Peru's National Commission Against Biopiracy has used its database
records to oppose the grant of patents containing Peruvian traditional
knowledge.332
Like the International Seed Treaty, the world's major economic
powers (with substantial intellectual property right-holding
constituencies) are not parties to the Nagoya Protocol. Early
experience suggests that the Nagoya Protocol shares weaknesses and
lacunae with the International Seed Treaty. For example, in 2010, a
subsidiary of Nestle filed international patent applications for
therapeutic derivatives of rooibos and honeybush, plants indigenous to
South Africa, and obtained them without the required permits under
the legislation implementing the Nagoya Protocol in South Africa.33

Nestle claimed that it had neither sourced the plants in South
Africa nor researched them there (claiming instead that they were
provided by South African suppliers of other goods), it had not yet
329. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn Guidelineson Access
to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equtable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out of Their
Ulization, CoNvErTIoN ON BIoLoGIcAL DIvERSITY 43, at 13 (2002), https://www.cbd.
int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf.
330. Id
331. About TKDL, TRADmoNAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBR., http://www.tkdl.res.in/
tkdl/angdefault/common/Abouttkdl.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
332. Permanent Mission of Peru, Combating Biopiracy-The Peruvian Experience,
Communication dated July 6, 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Peru to the WIPO
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, WiIPO, U.N. Doc. WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1 1/13, annex (July 9, 2007).
333. Nest6 Denies "RooibosRobbery,"BDLVE (May 28, 2010), http://www.bdlive.
co.za/articles/2010/05/28/nestle-denies-rooibos-robbery.
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commercialized any products (although that was not relevant under
South African law), and it would comply with the law when, or if, it
became necessary... The case highlights the ambiguities in the
Nagoya Protocol, not only over what constitutes covered material and
conduct regulated by the Protocol, but also what relationship third
parties may play in evading the Protocol's reach.
E

The InternationalCode ofMarketing ofBreast-Milk Substitutes

The International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes
(International Code), like the WHO's Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework, is, legally speaking, only a recommendation
adopted under article 23 of the WHO Constitution, rather than a more
formally binding treaty or international agreement."' However, the
recommendation is an evidence-based standard adopted by
international food safety bodies and is independently influential as a
human rights norm. 3
The International Code seeks to prevent companies from
advertising; implement strict labeling requirements, including a
proscription on infant images or other pictures that idealize breast-milk
substitutes; limit influence on health care workers; and prohibit
distribution of free samples of breast-milk substitutes. "7 Eighty-four
states have enacted legislation enacting all or some aspects of the
International Code, while another fourteen have legislation pending. "8
While the text of the International Code does not address
trademarks as explicitly as the WHO's FCTC, the Code prohibits
"pictures of infants [and] other pictures or text which may idealize the
use of infant formula.33. Major infant formula markets like Brazil,
China, and India have banned the use of images on infant formula
334. Id.
335. See U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 15 (2013) on
the Right of the Child to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art.
24), 144, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/15 (Apr. 17, 2013) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15 on
the Right of the Child]. Generally, WHA recommendations are not binding, but they "carry
moral or political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective
membership of the highest international body in the field of health" Sami Shubber, The
International Code of Marketing of Breast-A'lk Substitutes, 36 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS.
877, 884 (1985).
336. General Comment No. 15 on the Right of the Child, supra note 335; see Bhutta et
al., supranote 176, at 417.
337. Bhutta et al., supranote 176, at 418.
338. International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, UNICEF, http://
www.unicef.org/nutrition/index_24805.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2005).
339. Shubber, supra note 335, at 891 (quoting InternationalCode of Marketing of
Breast-MilkSubstitutes, supra note 24, art. 9.2).
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containers, while a growing number of developing and wealthy
countries are considering stronger measures to limit the appearance or
use of trademarks in connection with infant formula."
Codex, the joint international organization run by the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization and the WHO, has adopted the relevant
trademark restricting provisions of the International Code into its
Standard for Infant Formula and Formulas for Special Medical
Purposes Intended for Infants, which allows states to require that infant
formula "label[s] ... have no pictures of infants and women nor any
other picture or text which idealizes the use of infant formula."3 1' As
the standard-setting body for the WTO's Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures," 2 the adoption of the standard means that
parties to the WTO may ban images of infants and women without
concern that it may inappropriately burden trade. While the Codex
standard operates separately from measures sanctioned by TRIPS, the
standard effectively creates a safe harbor for banning trademarks on
infant formula products. Indeed, despite industry protest against states
and other political entities, like Hong Kong, that have restricted or
banned trademarks on infant formula, no state has brought a challenge
to those restrictions at the WTO, nor has any of the major food firms
used the strong enforcement mechanisms available through BITs to
protest prohibitions on infant images."
E

The FameworkConvention on Tobacco Control

Because tobacco consumption has declined in Europe and North
America as a result of strong public health measures and taxation
policies, 3" the global tobacco industry has focused on low- and
middle-income countries as key targets to sustain demand for

340. See, e.g., Jessica Samakow, Baby FormulaAds mn Sweden May Soon Be Banned
from FeaturingBabies, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huff-mgtonpost.com/2012/11/08/babyformula-ads-sweden-_n_2092920.html (last updated Dec. 12, 2012).
341. Codex Alimentanus, Standard for Infant Formula and Formulas for Special
Medical Purposes Intended for Infants, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N. (1981), http://www.
fao.org/input/download/standards/288/CXS_072e__2015.pdf.
342. About Codex, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N., http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codex
alimentarius/about-codex/en/ (last updated Feb. 1,2016).
343. Letter from The Indep. Packaging Ass'n et al., to Alexander Erwin (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.nam.org/Advocacy/he-Center-for-Legal-ActionBriefs-Ordine/2014/LWTO
plainpackaging-614/.
344. Erin Brodwin, Tobacco Companies Still Target Youth Despite a Global Treaty,
SC. AM. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tobacco-companies-stilltarget-youth/.
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conventional cigarettes."4 In developing and wealthy markets, tobacco
trademarks play a critical role in the broader advertising, promotion,
and marketing efforts that persuade young men and women to commit
to, and identify with, a specific brand of cigarette.
Trademarks must not only appeal to this target demographic, but
must also frame and shape the act of consuming cigarettes as less
dangerous. Framing includes minimizing or obfuscating mandatory
health warnings, using descriptors like "mild," "light" and "ultralight," and shaping cigarette containers-for example, to mimic
famous perfume packaging-to appeal to target populations. 346
Cigarette manufacturers also use package colors and images to shape
health perceptions. Two aspects of trademarks magnify these public
health problems in low- and middle-income countries. First, low- and
middle-income countries have larger populations who lack the
functional literacy necessary for written warnings that communicate
product risks. Therefore, regulation of pictures and images is
necessary for effective regulation. Second, trademarks in the cigarette
context are explicitly tied to the rise of middle-income classes in
wealthier countries. Indeed, the global morbidity and mortality burden
associated with tobacco consumption now falls heaviest on low- and
middle-income countries.347
Motivated by the public health burden imposed by tobacco
products and the success of the industry in thwarting regulation,
frequently on intellectual property grounds, Canada, Finland, Mexico,
and Tanzania sponsored the idea for an international agreement 8 to
regulate tobacco at the WHA in 1995." In 1998, member states
established a WHO FCTC Working Group to draft core treaty
elements and an intergovernmental negotiating body to develop the
text of the treaty." Member states adopted the treaty in 2003, and it
345. Id.
346. E.C. Etzel et al.,
ConsumerResearch Proposal: Camel FilterRevised Packaging
Test INDUSTRY DoCuMENTs LIBR. 5 (Mar. 2, 1979), http://legacy.library.ucsfedu/tid/qxb79
dOO. For example, cigarette manufacturers first marketed menthol cigarettes as a remedy for
a cold or the flu, and the green color of menthol-flavored cigarette packs preserves the
original association. M. Wakefield et al., The CigarettePack as Image: New Evidence from
Tobacco IndustryDocuments, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL i73, i77 (Supp. 12002).
347. Taylor, supa note 106, at 258.
348. Ruth Roemer et al., Ogins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control,95 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 936, 937-38 (2005).

349. See World Health Assembly Res. WHA48.11 (May 12, 1995), http://www.who.
int/tobacco/framework/whaeb/wha48_ 11/en/.
350. See Working Group Preceding the IntergovernmentalNegotiating Body on the
WHO FCTC (1999-2000), WHO, http://www.who.int/fctc/about/preneg-working.group/
en/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
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entered into force on February 27, 2005.25' One hundred and seventyseven parties have ratified or acceded to the FCTC as of September
2013.352
While the FCTC covers a wide range of supply and demand
factors affecting tobacco consumption, core aspects of its nonprice
provisions are aimed at eliminating or limiting trademark protection in
the tobacco context. Article 11 (packaging and labeling) and article 13
(promotion) include provisions curtailing trademark rights.

3

'

The

governing body of the treaty has included additional guidelines that
further erode international protections for tobacco trademarks.354
Section 1(a) of article 11 regulating packaging and labeling
provides that each party will take measures to ensure that
tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco
product by any means that are false, misleading, deceptive or likely to
create an erroneous impression about the product's characteristics,
health effects, hazards or emissions, including any term, descriptor,
trademark or figurative or other sign that directly or indirectly creates
the false impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful
than others. 5
In addition, section 1(b) of article 11 requires that packages carry
health warnings describing the harmful effects of tobacco use that
must cover no less than 30% of the principal display area, but
recommends coverage of 50% or more of the display area. "6
The guidelines for the implementation of article 11 state that
countries should consider regulatory measures that effectively
eliminate the use or effectiveness of trademarks. "7 Paragraph 7
recommends large, graphic health warnings because they are more
noticeable, better communicate health risks, provoke a greater
emotional response, and increase motivation to quit or decrease
tobacco consumption. "8 Paragraph 8 provides that health warnings
should be located on both the front and back of the package, at the top
351. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adoptedMay 21, 2003, 2302
U.N.TS. 166 [hereinafter FCTC].
352. Working Group Precedingthe IntergovermmentalNegotiatingBody on the WHO
FCTC (1999-2000), supra note 350.
353. See FCTC, supra note 351,arts. 11, 13.
354. Halabi, supr note 103.
355. FCTC, supra note 351, art. lI(1)(a).
356. Seeid art. ll(1)(b).
357. See Guidelines for Implementation of Artice 11 of the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, WHO, http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/articlel1.pdf
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
358. See id 17.
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of all principal display areas.359 Paragraph 9 suggests that health
warnings should also be located on all sides of the package, inserts,
and onserts." ° Referencing article 11.1(b)(v), paragraph 12 of the
guidelines encourages parties to require health warnings that cover
more than 50% of the principal display areas,36 ' and paragraph 16
recommends that these warnings should be pictorial because they will
"disrupt the impact of brand imagery" and the overall attractiveness of
the package. 62
Paragraph 43 affects words and phrases that would normally be
subject to trademark protection. It provides a nonexhaustive list of
terms, as mentioned in article 11.1(a), which "creates the false
impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than
others. '363 Paragraphs 8, 10, and 54 address obstruction of warnings by
other elements of packaging or trade dress." Paragraph 8 states that
health warnings should not be damaged or concealed by the normal
opening of the package." '5 Paragraph 10 reiterates the need for
warnings to remain unobstructed by other elements of the packaging,
such as labelling markings, inserts, and onserts 6 Finally, paragraph
54 indicates that warnings should not be obscured, obliterated, or
undermined by extraneous adhesive labels, stickers, cases, covers,
sleeves, and wrappings.367 Paragraph 46 addresses plain packaging:
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use
of logos, colours, brand images or promotional information on

packaging other than brand names and product names displayed in a
standard colour and font style (plain packaging). This may increase the

noticeability and effectiveness of health warnings and messages,
prevent the package from detracting attention from them, and address
industry package design techniques that may suggest that some
products are less harmful than others.366
Article 13 on advertising, promotion, and sponsorship also
affects trademark rights. 9 Sections 2 and 3 of article 13 require a
party, subject to its constitutional principles, either to ban or to apply
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Seeid
See id
Seeid
Id 16.
Id. 43.
Seeid
Seeid.
Seeid.

8.
9.
12.

367.

Seeid

54.

368.
369.

Id. 46.
SeeFCTC, supmnote 351, art. 13.

8, 10,54.
8.
10.
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restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion, and sponsorship. " °
Section 4 sets minimum standards, subject to the national constitution,
for restrictions on tobacco advertising."' It requires a prohibition on
all forms of advertising, promotion, and sponsorship that promote
tobacco by means that are false, misleading, deceptive, or likely to
create an erroneous impression about its characteristics, health effects,
hazards, or emissions;.. that health warnings accompany all tobacco
advertising;.73 a ban or restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion,
or sponsorship on radio, television, print media, and other media as
appropriate; 374 and a prohibition or restriction on tobacco sponsorship
of international events, activities, or participants.
Several countries, including Uruguay,376 Thailand, and India,3 8
have implemented or introduced legislation to implement plain
packaging or similar restrictions on tobacco products. Uruguay
became the first country to introduce substantial (80%) trademark
restrictions and pictorial warnings in 2009. 379 Uruguay's primary
tobacco packaging provisions require that packs be covered by graphic
warnings, with images such as rotting teeth and premature babies, to
discourage smoking.3 ° In addition, a firm may not sell different brand
variants, which means tobacco firms may not use variants on words
like "light" to shape health perceptions of its products. 81

370. See id art. 13(2)-(3).
371. Seeid art. 13(4).
372. See id art. 13(4)(a).
373. Seeid art. 13(4)(b).
374. See id. art. 13(4)(e).
375. See id. art. 13(4)(f).
376. Philip Mois FumingAbout Uruguay Graphic Cigarette Packagingto the Tune
of $25M, Fox NEWS LAnNo (Sept. 16, 2014), http://Iatino.foxnews.com/latino/money/
2014/09/16/philip-morris-fuming-about-uruguay-graphic-cigarette-packaging-to-tune-25 m/;
see Halabi, supra note 4, at 753-63.
377. Prathana Rebecca Knapp & Nutthakarn Phongphunpunya, Striking a Baance:
Public Health vs IP Rights in Thailand8 Cigarette Package Rules, ANANDA INTELL. PROP.
NEWSL. (Ananda Intellectual Prop., Bangkok, Thai.), Mar. 2014, at 2, 2-5, http://www.
ananda-ip.com/files/AnandaIPNewsletterMarch2014.pdf.
378. UP Court Recommends Plain Packaging for Cigarettes, HINDUSTAN TiMEs,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/up-court-recommends-plain-packaging-forcigarettes/story-2et71356qUSKE4KZKTgvEM.html (last updated July 25, 2014, 7:01 PM).
379. Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packagingand the Interpretation of the
TRlIPSAgreemen4 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1149, 1158 (2013).

380. PhilipMorrisFumingAbout Uruguays Graphic CigarettePackagingto the Tune
of$25M, supranote 376.
381. Id.
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Following Uruguay, Australia introduced plain packaging in
December 2013.382 Under Australia's legislation, packs must be a
standard, dark brown color 83 and comply with the following structural
aspects: they must have no decorative ridges, embossing, bulges, or
irregularities in shape or texture;' the edges must be ridged, straight,
and not beveled or otherwise shaped or embellished in any way;. 5
packs may not make a noise or produce a scent that could be construed
as advertising or promotion;3 . they may not include features intended
to change after sale, such as heat-activated inks or inks that are visible
38
only in certain light;8 7 and they may not include inserts or onserts.
Packs may only state the brand and variant name in a font, size, and
color that is uniform across all brands389 and may not display any
trademarks or other identifying marks.3 In addition, packs are
required to display large health warnings with graphics and
explanatory messages over at least 75% of the front surface of tobacco
packaging and 75-90% of the back surface. 9 ' The paper casings of
cigarettes are also regulated; they must either be white or white with an
imitation cork tip."'
The FCTC has so far proved effective at creating a safe
regulatory space for the modification or elimination of tobacco
trademarks. Plain packaging has survived in Australia due in part to
3 93 While there is as yet no
its adoption pursuant to the FCTC.
arbitration decision based on expropriation of tobacco trademarks, the
FCTC has provided an important legal basis for Australia and Uruguay
to claim that no award is appropriate in light of a binding multilateral

382. Jamie Smyth, Austahia Smoking Rates Tumble After PlainPackagingShif; FIN.
TIMES (July 17, 2014, 2:36 AM), http://www.ft.com/intIcms/s/0/c4016952-0d4a-1 le4-bcb200144feabdcO.html.
383. Jonathan Liberman, Plainly Constitutional: The Upholding of Plain Tobacco
Packagingby the High CourtofAustalia 39 AM. J.L.& MED. 361, 361 (2013).
384. 1d.at 363.

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
note 200.

Id
Id.at 364.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 361.
Id.at 364.
Id.
Id.
SeeKnapp & Phongphunpunya, supra note 377, at 2; Porterfield & Byrnes, supra
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agreement that modifies trademark protections otherwise available in
their BITs. 94
There are weaknesses, although ostensibly fewer of them, with
the FCTC as well. Much of the language in the FCTC, and nearly all
that used in the guidelines, is precatory, and there have been wide
variations in implementation."' A subsequent protocol to the FCTC on
illicit trade in tobacco products allowed countries to effectively use
TRIPS as an alternative to other protocol measures. 96 Separately,
tobacco firms have become involved in drafting international trade
agreements to strengthen intellectual property protections in light of
trends in FCTC implementation. PMI, for example, has lobbied the
USTR to include strong investment protections for tobacco trademarks
in the proposed TPP."
V.

THE DESIGN AND OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS

Taken together, the aforementioned international agreements
regulate intellectual property by creating conditions for access to
patentable subject matter, eliminating or substantially modifying
trademarks at their core level (i.e., by source identification), and
redistributing the benefits of intellectual property that either draw from
the resources of low- and middle-income countries or disproportionately affect their welfare, or both. Heretofore, these agreements
have been understood to represent advances of one sort or another in
their respective contexts: environmental law, indigenous peoples' law,
public health law, or the law of biological diversity. More are coming.
In 2010, Thailand introduced large graphic warning labels for alcohol
containers some years after public health advocates argued that the
WHO should develop a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
394. See Liberman, supra note 383; Valentina S. Vadi, Global Health Governance at a
Crossroads." Trademark Protection v Tobacco Controlin InternationalInvestment Law, 48
STAN. J. INT'L L. 93, 97 (2012); Mark Deen & Gabi Thesing, France To Mandate Plain
Packaging of Cigarettes, NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 27, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.
newsobserver.com/2014/09/27/4186135/france-to-mandate-plain-packaging.html; Knapp &
Phongphunpunya, supra note 377; Porterfield & Byrnes, supra note 200; Philip Morris
FumingAbout Uruguay Graphic CigarettePackagingto the Tune of$25M, supra note 376.
395. See Gary Fooks & Anna B. Gilmore, Special Communication, International
Trade Law, Plain Packaging and Tobacco Industiy PoliticalActivity The Trans-Pacific
Partnership,23 TOBACCO CONTROL art. el, at 1, 1 (2014), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/
content/23/1/el.full.pdf.
396. About the Protocol To Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, WHO,
http://www.who.int/fctc/protocol/about/en/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
397. Porterfield & Byrnes, supianote 200.
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modeled on the FCTC.398 Argentina and Brazil have called for a
reorientation of WIPO, which may include a so-called "access to
knowledge" treaty.399
There are at least two key implications for understanding
biodiversity and public health treaties as part of a wider trend of
resistance to expansive intellectual property protections asserted
through bilateral and multilateral investment and trade treaties. First,
forming parallel agreements that curtail or modify intellectual property
rights may be just as or more effective than leveraging flexibilities
under current investment and trade instruments or using hard-nosed
negotiation over intellectual property protections in new treaties.
Current scholars tend to emphasize the use of intellectual property
framing as part of wider mobilization of social movements contesting
the expansion of intellectual property rights through international
agreements. 4° In her thoughtful study of "the new politics of
intellectual property," for example, Amy Kapczynski notes widespread
protests against TRIPS in India, the failure of the Clinton
Administration to effect a range of digital copyright treaties, and the
efforts to reorient WIIPO toward a "development agenda" are part of
the success that counter-intellectual-property mobilization forces have
enjoyed by framing many development and human rights issues as
fundamentally about "intellectual property. 4 1 But of the international
agreements that have experienced the most success in curtailing
intellectual property rights (with the possible exception of the Doha
Declaration), the 1981 International Code and the FCTC effectively
used individual and public health threats as subtle means by which to
circumvent strong trademark protections in specific contexts.
Second, understanding the growing network of intellectual
property that explicitly curtails intellectual property rights in areas like
agriculture and public health as a discrete corpus of international
economic law opens new possibilities for understanding the
398. Patrick Barta & Christina Passariello, Global Liquor Makers Fight Graphic
Labels hi Thailand, WALL STREET J.,http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487
04392104575475513718846130 (last
updated Sept. 17, 2010, 12:01 AM).
399. See Viviana Mufioz Tellez & Sisule E Musungu, A2K at WIPO The
Development Agenda and the Debate on the ProposedBroadcasting Treaty, in ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 175, 178 (Galle Krikorian & Amy

Kapczynski eds., 2010); see also Treaty on Access to Knowledge, CONSUMER

PROJECT ON

(May 9, 2005), http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k-treaty may9.pdf (outlining a draft of
the proposal).
400. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization andthe New
PoliticsofIntellectualProperty,117 YALE L.J. 804, 832 (2008).
401. Id.
TECH.
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circumstances under which international intellectual property shelters
form, as well as under what conditions they may achieve their
objectives. There are at least two of these factors worth exploring
further: the nature of the global market in which shelters form and the
process by which firms within that market are allowed to participate in
the establishment and processes of the shelters. The purpose of this
discussion is simply to provide an overview of the value of
understanding the agreements discussed in Part IV as a cohesive
whole, not to provide an exhaustive evaluation of the factors affecting
international intellectual property shelters' targets and designs, which
are elaborated elsewhere.
A.

Global ConcentratonofKnowledge-intensiveIndustries

The emergence of international intellectual property shelters
coincides almost precisely with the global concentration of the
industries that have most aggressively asserted their intellectual
property rights. For example, the 1981 International Code is
effectively a Nestle-specific agreement, which, even in 1981,
controlled 50% of the global infant formula market."°2 When Canada,
Finland, Tanzania, and Mexico introduced the idea of a global tobacco
control treaty at the WHO, four corporations controlled 75% of the
global tobacco market and already demonstrated a strong ability to
shape health perceptions of their products through the use of their
trademarks.0 3 Of the forty-two members of the Pharmaceutical
Research Manufacturers Association that existed in 1988, only eleven
remained as of 2012.4
Similar consolidation occurred in the proprietary seed and
agrochemical markets, in which four firms control 56% of the global
market.0 ' Indeed, until recently, the division between pharmaceutical
and agrochemical corporations was not so clear. The Swiss
pharmaceutical giant Novartis formed after a merger between CibaGeigy and Sandoz and consolidated massive pharmaceutical and

402. Katherine DeLand, Gemma Lien & Heather Wipfli, The WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control and the Tobacco Free Initiative, in THE GLOBAL TOBACCO
EPIDEMIC AND THE LAW 11, 13 (Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania voon eds., 2014); Infant
Formula: Hawking Disasterin the Third World MULTmAONAL MONITOR (Apr. 1987),

http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1987/04/formula.html.
403.

DeLand, Lien & Wipfli, supranote 402, at 13.

404.

John L. LaMattina, Comment, The Impact ofMergers on PharmaceuticalR&D,

10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 559, 559 (2011).
405. Howard, supra note 26, at 1270.
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agrochemical units." In 2000, Novartis spun off its agrochemical unit
into Syngenta, the world's third largest seed and agrochemical
company, which draws more than half its sales from emerging
markets." 7 Syngenta is now in merger negotiations with Monsanto,
which holds the world's largest share of the global commercial seed
market."°8 Bayer, which controls more of the global market of seeds
and agrochemicals than any other firm except Monsanto, maintains a
substantial share of the global pharmaceutical market, although much
less than Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, and Pfizer. 409
Crosslicensing between these firms in specific product sectors means
even tighter concentration than market share alone suggests."'
The corresponding capacity of those firms to control and/or
influence forms of knowledge, or otherwise use their market positions
to influence population health outcomes (e.g., relating to tobacco),
prompted the development of treaties to constrain their behavior.
Indeed, it was the formation of the large network of international
investment and trade treaties that had allowed global consolidation to
occur in the medicines, seeds, and tobacco contexts.
That international intellectual property shelters are in fact efforts
at supranational regulation of global firms is supported by the
perceptions of the firms themselves. When momentum picked up for
the establishment of an international agreement regulating the use of
infant images and other visuals to promote breast-milk substitutes,
Nestl6 established a central office under the control of its chief
operating officer to coordinate the responses of each global market."'
The global tobacco industry put the conceptual notion of supranational
regulation at the core of its fierce resistance to the FCTC. In one of its
many communications regarding the treaty, British American Tobacco
argued that supranational regulation was warranted "'only if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved' by individual countries:' a line echoed in submissions by
406. Company Istory, SYNGENTA, http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en
about-syngenta/Pages/company-history.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
407. Id.
408.

Jack Kaskey, Monsanto Says Its EvaluatingAnother Takeover Bid for Syngenta,

BLOOMBERG Bus., http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-17/monsanto-says-it-sevaluating-another-takeover-bid-for-syngenta (last updated Nov. 18, 2015, 2:04 AM).
409. Philip H. Howard, Seed Industry Structure, MICH. ST. U., https://msu.edu/-

howardp/seedindustry.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
410. Id

411. Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin, Inc., Executive Summary The WHO Tobacco
Control Convention, INDUSTRY DoCuMENTs LIBR. (Nov. 1997), http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/
tid/xmm50d00.
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Brown & Williamson to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. 12' Because tobacco control measures could be adopted at the
national level, the argument went, there was no need for an
international instrument.413 PMI endeavored to discredit the WHO as a
tobacco regulatory body and sought to weaken the treaty through its
influence on the U.S. delegation.""
The global pharmaceutical industry similarly tended to discuss
broad access-to-medicines agreements and frameworks in terms of
their regulatory nature. Reacting to the ways in which the Doha
Declaration altered the global landscape of pharmaceutical patents, the
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and
Associations (IFPMA), the global pharmaceutical trade group, argued
that compulsory licenses "are certainly not a solution to access
problems" and that "frequent use of them could discourage the
introduction of new medicines ... and ... undermine[s] the system
that underpins the ability of the private sector to undertake essential
R&D [(research and development)]." ' The negotiations over the
establishment of the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework were viewed, at least by the IFPMA, as fundamentally
about what level of supranational regulation would be imposed for
them to participate in the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response
network for virus samples with pandemic potential.1 6
B.

The Design of InternationalIntellectualPropertyShelters

If international intellectual property shelters are effectively lowand middle-income country-led efforts to regulate knowledge412. Comments of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporationon the World Health
OrganizationFramework Convention on Tobacco Control, INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS LIBR. 11
(Mar. 29, 2000), http://Iegacy.library.ucsfedu/tid/uri45a99 (quoting Treaty of Amsterdam
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European
Communities and Certain Related Acts art. 5, Oct. 2,1997, 2700 U.N.T.S. 161).
413. Comments ofBtitsh Ameican Tobacco PLC on the WorldHealth Organization
Framework Conventon on Tobacco Control, INDuSTRY DocuMENrS LIBR. (Oct. 2000),
http://1egacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/kwc65a99.
414.
415.

Id
Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns, PrincipalFocus and Actions of the
Research-Based Pharmaceutical Industry m Contributing to Global HealtA IRISH
PHARMACEUTICAL HEALTHCARE ASS'N 5 n.15 (Feb. 27, 2008), http://www.ipha.ie/Get

Attachment.aspx?id=6ae6c382-lc3a-49ec-bf25-cd6fc3d3f24f&usg.
416. Michael Watson & Sanofi Pasteur, Update.- Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
(PIP)Framework for the Sharing of Influerza Viises and Access to Vaccines and Other
Benefits: Industry Perspective, GLOBAL VACCIES 202X, https://globalvaccines202xsympo
sium.wordpress.com/update-pandemic-influenza-preparedness-framework/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2016).
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intensive firms at the international level, then it is also plausible that
those regulatory regimes may be captured, restrained, or effectively
structured to secure important public interests like health protection
and food security. It is far too early to assess the relative strength of
the shelters identified above in facilitating their stated objectives like
protecting individuals from the health perceptions trademarks shape,
ensuring that patents and data exclusivity do not erect insuperable
barriers to access to medicines, or preserving traditional forms of
agriculture and seed exchange. However, it is possible to identify
different aspects of how international intellectual property shelters are
constructed and at least preliminary reasons to believe that some
regulatory designs may better promote welfare-enhancing objectives
than others.
Within the shelters identified above, some entirely barred
participation by regulated firms, while others included them as integral
parts of the negotiation process. The WHO allowed participation by
"representatives of non-Member States, of liberation movements
referred to in resolution WHA27.37, of organizations of the U.N.
system, of intergovernmental organizations with which WHO has
established effective relations, and of nongovernmental organizations
in official relations with WHO," effectively cutting global tobacco
firms out of the official treaty drafting process (although they could
and did participate as part of national delegations).4 " The FCTC
codified this norm in article 5.3, which required parties to protect their
health policies from tobacco industry interests, made even stronger in
guidelines issued by the Conference of the Parties, which declared a
"fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco
industry's interests and public health" and set forth recommendations
that, at their strongest, quashed tobacco company participation in the
policy-making process altogether.4"8
The International Code, by contrast, involved regulated firms
from its first draft. Not only were infant formula company
representatives from nine countries consulted by WHO drafters, but
also by the global trade group, the International Council of Infant Food
Industries." 9 Similarly, the WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Framework could not have materialized, at least in its present form,
without the participation of the major global pharmaceutical firms
because they not only promise to share benefits of participation in the
417. World Health Assembly Res. WHA59.24, supranote 19.
418. FCTC, supranote 351, art. 5.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
419. Shubber, supm note 335, at 903 n.59.
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Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, but they also
fund its operation. 2 '
Between full participation and prohibition of formal participation
exist a number of possibilities, including participation as part of
national delegations, the forms of influence firms may exercise
through each channel, and what role, if any, direct financial support for
negotiations or shelter mechanisms may play. Each of these factors
may influence the extent to which a given international intellectual
property shelter effectively reorients intellectual property rights from
private wealth accumulation to redistribution or furtherance of global
population health and nutrition outcomes.
International intellectual property shelters similarly may void an
entire class or category of intellectual property, alter the ways in which
intellectual property protection affects prices, or condition access to
promising sources of intellectual property on redistribution of benefits
thereby derived. The FCTC, for example, explicitly calls for states to
adopt measures that ensure that "trademark[s do not] directly or
indirectly create[] [a] false impression that a particular tobacco product
is less harmful than other tobacco products."' 2 ' It implicitly regulates
trademarks by recommending large, graphic warnings as part of
tobacco product labeling.42 The International Code similarly urges
prohibitions on "pictures of infants, [and] other pictures or text which
may idealize the use of infant formula."23
The WHO's expert report calling for an international treaty to
address the development of drugs and products that focus on the needs
of low- and middle-income countries urges the delinking of innovation
costs and product prices to condition coverage of research costs on
open knowledge research and development and open innovation
models in which research costs are covered by public or philanthropic
sources and research results are made available in the public domain,
licensing conditions imposed by funders or research organizations
permit nonexclusive licensing or prescribe a low target price for a
product, and prize funds involve separate payments to compensate for
the costs of research and development and prescribe either
predetermined product prices at a low level or permit competitive
420. It would have been possible for member states themselves to have agreed to
procure vaccines from manufacturers and then donate or provide them to the WHO at
discounted rates.
421. FCTC,supmnote351,art. 11.
422. Seeid
423. InternationalCode ofMarketingofBirast-Miik Substitutes, supranote 24, art. 9.
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manufacture of developed products; "more comprehensive schemes
envisage wholesale replacement of the intellectual property system
by government-funded payments for R&D.'24
...

The WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
conditions access to biological materials collected through the Global
Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) on promises to
provide pandemic vaccines, share intellectual property, or share doses
of antiviral medicines, as well as requiring pharmaceutical, medical
device, and diagnostic firms to pay for half of the GISRS system.25'
Whatever the context, international intellectual property shelters
are at least in part a result of globalization at its core. The emergence
of a small number of global firms that dominate knowledge-intensive
markets was made possible through the expanding network of trade
and investment treaties. The dependence of those firms on legal
protections for intangible assets has encouraged them to persistently
press for stronger intellectual property laws even in contexts in which
substantial public interests may require more flexibility. In those
contexts, international intellectual property shelters mediate the
creation, flow, and concentration of global wealth between wealthy and
low- or middle-income countries. Each of these aspects of the
development of international intellectual property shelters demands
treatment far more extensive than what is allowed here. This Article
has endeavored only to argue that these phenomena should be
understood as a cohesive body of international economic law, studied
as part of the response to growing international intellectual property
protections and evaluated for their purposes and designs.
VI. CONCLUSION

Confrontations between expanding intellectual property rights
and the development interests of low- and middle-income states are
now poised to increase as international agreements addressing both
proliferate. 2 ' This Article argues that agreements to preserve access to
medicines, protect population health, and ensure food security should
be seen not only as responses to the overreach of international
intellectual property agreements, but also as forms of supranational
regulation over highly concentrated global industries that benefit most
424. Consultative Expert Working Grp. on Research & Dev.: Fin. & Coordination,
supm note 231, at 37.
425. See Pandemicinfluenza PreparednessFramework,supra note 18.
426. See Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law
Requirement in InternationalInvestrnentLaw,34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1473, 1482-86 (2011).
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from the privatization of knowledge creation.
That assertion
necessarily entails study of the structure of global businesses working
in these areas, as well as the governments with which those businesses
are affiliated or look to for support and promotion. As forms of
regulation, international intellectual property shelters' designs will
ultimately determine how well they achieve their objectives, whether
those are protections of global public welfare or merely efforts to
redistribute wealth from rich to poor or vice versa, and in which
contexts additional shelters are likely to emerge. This Article has
endeavored to take the first of these steps by identifying a heretofore
unrecognized phenomenon at work in international economic law.

